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The end of the Cold War signaled hard times ahead for 
both public and private manufacturers in the Nation’s 
Defense Industry.  Army-controlled manufacturing Arsenals, 
subject to Governmental control and requirements to 
maintain excess mobilization capacity, found themselves 
increasingly unable to compete with private industry on 
cost.  Set-aside protectionist legislation, especially the 
Army Arsenal Act and the Stratton Amendments, played an 
increasing role in the ability of the Arsenals to obtain 
work.  The Army Arsenal Act applies to “make or buy” 
decisions and the Stratton Amendment restricts the transfer 
of large-caliber cannon technology to foreign nations.  The 
LW155 Joint Program Office has dealt with both statutes 
because it manages a multi-national weapon system with a 
large-caliber cannon and is scheduled for production by the 
Army.  This report uses the LW155 Program as a case study 
to examine three areas of importance to a Program Manager:  
the application of the Army Arsenal Act to joint service 
programs; the prime contractor’s ability to control the 
origin of component parts; and the constraints upon multi-
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The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet 
Union signaled the closing stages of a period of abundance 
for both public and private manufacturers in the Nation's 
defense industry.  The "peace dividend" resulted in a 
defense budget reduced to its lowest level, as a percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product, since before World War II [Ref. 
54: p. 24].  When work had been plentiful, the allocation 
of work between private industry and the arsenals had not 
created problems.  However, as available defense 
manufacturing work began to dwindle, the arsenals found 
their bureaucratic ties to the Government made them less 
efficient than private industry. This, coupled with the 
Defense Department's gravitation toward outsourcing 
associated with Acquisition Reform and the focus on fiscal 
responsibility, led to loss of work for arsenals at an 
alarming rate [Ref. 9: p. 56-59].   
In 1920, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation, known 
today as the Army Arsenal Act, designed to protect the 
Nation's manufacturing arsenals from sitting idle if they 
could perform work as efficiently as private sources [Ref. 
50: p. 6-7].  In 1986, the Congress enacted similar 
protectionist legislation, known as the Stratton Amendment, 
to safeguard the arsenals from the export of proprietary 
large-caliber cannon tube technology for manufacture in 
other countries [Ref. 28: para. (a)].  
The XM777 Joint Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW155) 
Program was a joint venture between the Marine Corps and 
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the Army established in the mid 1990's [Ref. 15: p. 2-3].  
As a weapon system program that involved both the Army and 
a large-caliber cannon, the Joint Program Office (JPO) 
found itself confronted with both Army Arsenal Act and 
Stratton Amendment issues [Ref. 36]. 
B. PROJECT PURPOSE 
This project will explore both the basis for and 
impacts of the decisions made by the JPO concerning use of 
National Arsenals. This project will provide Program 
Managers (PMs) with a case study resource for similar 
decisions.  It provides a history of the LW155 Program, our 
National Arsenals, the Army Arsenal Act, and the Stratton 
Amendment.  It then explores in detail the points where the 
Act and the Amendment have interacted with the LW155 
program.  It then analyzes why, at the policy level, these 
interactions occurred; the JPO's reaction each time they 
were faced with decisions regarding the legislation; and 
the results and ramifications of their decisions.  Finally, 
it recommends ways that PMs can better prepare themselves 
to deal with the implications the Act and the Amendment. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to accomplish the purpose of this project 
research, the following primary and subsidiary research 
questions were established: 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the impact of the Army Arsenal Act (10 U.S.C. 
4532) of 1920 and the Stratton Amendment (10 U.S.C. 4542) 
of 1986 upon the development and procurement of Department 
of Defense (DoD) Weapon Systems such as the LW155? 
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2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What is the XM777 Joint Lightweight Howitzer 
Program? 
b. What are the Army Arsenal Act and the Stratton 
Amendments? 
c. On what occasions have the Army Arsenal Act and 
the Stratton Amendments affected the LW155 
Program and why, how did the JPO react, and what 
were the ramifications on the program of their 
reactions?  
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The project addresses the impact of the Arsenal Act 
and the Stratton Amendment on DoD programs in general and 
the LW155 Program in particular.  It reports the positions 
and the actions taken by the JPO in response to the 
restrictions outlined in both the Arsenal Act and the 
Stratton Amendment.  It attempts to trace "cause and 
effect" relationships between actions by stakeholders in 
the Nation’s arsenals and the LW155 JPO.   
This researcher is a program management student and 
the purpose of this study is ultimately to determine 
program management considerations for utilizing National 
Arsenals.  As such, the bulk of the information is analyzed 
from a program, not an arsenal, perspective. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
This study assumes that the reader is generally 
familiar with the Federal Government acquisition process.  
The study also assumes the reader has a general knowledge 




This project first provides a background of the LW155 
Program, the history of arsenals, the Army Arsenal Act, and 
the Stratton Amendment.  It then presents a review of the 
laws, policies, and regulations that address protection of 
Government industrial assets followed by a comprehensive 
review of occasions where the Program, the Act, and the 
Amendment have interacted.  These facts are necessary to 
understand their influence on the JPO's decision-making 
process.  The research then transitions to an analysis of 
(1) why the interaction between the program and the 
legislation occurred, (2) the JPO's reaction, and (3) the 
ramifications on the program of their reactions.  In order 
to fully answer these questions, the analysis begins by 
addressing the major changes in the defense industrial base 
in the post-Cold War environment and then shifts to the 
specifics of the program.  Finally, the author provides 
recommendations for PMs faced with Army Arsenal Act and 
Stratton Amendment issues in the future.   
This is accomplished through literature research, data 
collection, and personal interviews including the 
following: 
• Unclassified Department of Defense publications, 
regulations, and policy memorandums 
• Official documentation from the LW155 JPO  
• Interviews with LW155 JPO personnel 
• Interviews with ARDEC Chief Counsel 
• General Accounting Office reports  
• Legal decisions from the U.S. Circuit Courts 
• Historical reports in defense publications 
  5
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Program Managers can use the results of this study as 
a guide when establishing their program's position with 
respect to the Army Arsenal Act and/or the Stratton 
Amendment.   
H. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
• Chapter I. Introduction:  Identifies the purpose 
of the project, primary and subsidiary research 
questions, the methodology and potential benefit 
of the study. 
• Chapter II. Background:  An overview of the LW155 
Program, the history of arsenals, the Army 
Arsenal Act, and the Stratton Amendment.   
• Chapter III. Presentation of Data:  A review of 
the laws, Government policies and Army 
regulations related to protectionist legislation 
in general and the Army Arsenal Act and Stratton 
Amendment in particular.  It then presents GAO 
report data regarding the decline of 
manufacturing arsenal capacity utilization and 
work loading since the end of the Cold War.  
Finally, it presents the major occasions for 
interaction between the LW155 program and the 
legislation in question.  These are categorized 
as (1) the litigation; (2) the purchase of 
components vs. "System Buy" contracts; and (3) 
foreign involvement in cannon assembly 
production. 
• Chapter IV. Analysis:  Begins with analysis of 
events resulting from post-Cold War defense 
downsizing that led to Rock Island Arsenal's 
eventual accusations of violations of the Arsenal 
Act by the LW155. It then ends with analysis of 
program and legislative interaction as outlined 
in the previous chapter. 
• Chapter V. Conclusions and Recommendations:  
Summarizes the conclusions from the analysis, 
thus answering the research questions.  It also 
makes recommendations for program managers 
concerning the Act and the Amendment and 
  6
potential effects on their programs.  Potential 




The following chapter provides a comprehensive review 
of the LW155 Program, the Army Arsenal Act, and the 
Stratton Amendment.  Background on the program and the 
associated legislation is necessary to fully understand 
their subsequent interaction.  The LW155 Program review 
begins with a description of the system and is followed by 
a more detailed discussion of the areas of schedule, cost, 
and performance (SCP) as a method for outlining the life 
cycle of the program.  The background of the Army Arsenal 
Act and the Stratton Amendment begins with a short review 
of their recent history and problems faced by Army Arsenals 
and ends with a review of the history and language of the 
two pieces of legislation.  
The majority of the LW155 Program’s SCP difficulties 
outlined in this chapter were presented by the GAO, at the 
request of Congress, in their multiple reviews of the 
program.  It is important to note that, while the use of 
the SCP difficulties is a practical manner of presentation 
easily understood by most acquisition professionals, it 
focuses primarily on the problems, rather than the 
successes of any program.  Therefore, it is imperative to 
mention up front that the LW155 program is a program with 
many successes.  The Program completed a rigorous 
Operational Assessment (OA) where they successfully 
validated or sufficiently addressed all of the technical 
performance issues identified in the GAO Reports.  
Furthermore, the Program entered the Production and 
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Deployment Phase of the Acquisition Life Cycle with a 
positive Milestone C decision in November of 2002. 
B. THE LW155 PROGRAM 
1. The Program 
The LW155 is a Joint Marine Corps and Army towed 
artillery weapon system designed to provide both close and 
deep fires to support both Marine Corps and Army maneuver 
forces.  The Marine Corps is responsible for funding the 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) for the 
howitzer portion of the system, which is designated by the 
military nomenclature, XM777.  The Army is responsible for 
funding the RDT&E for the Towed Artillery Digitization 
(TAD) enhancements [Ref. 24: p. 191].  The Marine Corps 
acquisition objective is 377 howitzers with an Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) date of March 2005. The Army 
acquisition objective is 273 howitzers with an IOC date of 
August 2006.  The Army has currently funded 233 of the 273 
planned systems [Ref. 38].  The Army anticipates, but has 
not yet funded, fielding an additional 114 howitzers to 
their Interim Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) [Ref. 15: p. 14].  
The Marine Corps will field the howitzers without the TAD 
enhancements while the Army plans to wait to field the 
howitzer and TAD as a complete system [Ref. 15: p. 2].  The 
LW155 was designed to replace the aging 155mm M198 weapon 
system.  The M198 currently serves as the only cannon fire 
support system for the Marine Corps and as a Direct and 
General Support weapon system for the Army’s light and 
interim forces.  The planned performance improvements of 
the XM777 lightweight howitzer over the M198 are listed in 




Table 1.   XM777 Projected Performance 
Improvements [Ref. 19: p. 6] 
 
The system weight, emplacement, and displacement times are 
all weapon system Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).1  The 
goal of the LW155 Program is to produce and field a weapon 
system that is lighter weight and creates a smaller 
logistics footprint than the M198.  These characteristics 
will provide for improved strategic deployment, tactical 
mobility, and survivability for the LW155 weapon system 
[Ref. 7: p. 2]. 
Currently,  towed  artillery  systems, such as the 
M198, require external survey capability and local unit 
fire direction support.  The TAD system will enable the 
XM777 to compute ballistics on the gun, navigate while on 
the move, and self-locate using Global Positioning System 
(GPS) capabilities [Ref. 19: p. 7]. This technology will 
provide greater speed and employment flexibility that is 
similar to that possible with the Army’s self-propelled 
artillery, rocket, and missile systems. 
                     
1
 The original KPP for Weight was 9,000 pounds for the howitzer and 
500 pounds for the TAD.  The KPP was changed to 10,500 pounds with TAD, 
to coincide with the lift capabilities of the V-22 Osprey.  The KPP has 
since been adjusted to 10,000 pounds.  As of the Milestone C Briefing 
on 8 November 2002, the predicted weight of the howitzer with TAD was 
just under 9,800 pounds [Ref. 38]. 
XM777M198
Weight 16,000 lbs 9,000 lbs
C-130 Capacity       1 Howitzer 2 Howitzers
Max Rate of Fire 4 Rds/min 5-8 Rds/min
Range 30 Km (assisted) 30-40 Km (assisted)
Emplacement Time 8 Min < 3 Min
Displacement Time                          11 Min    < 2 Min
Primer Mechanism Manual Single Round  Auto-primer Feed
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2. Schedule 
The Marine Corps in 1993, and the Army in 1994, 
approved the Mission Needs Statement for the LW155 [Ref. 53 
and Ref. 44].  The original Joint Operational Requirements 
Document (JORD) was approved by both Services in 1995 [Ref. 
7: p. 1].  As a result, the Government released the Request 
for Proposal (RFP) soliciting offers for the LW155 
development contract on April 10, 1996.  The intent of the 
acquisition strategy was to leverage the development of 
existing competitive prototypes.  An evaluative nine-month 
shoot-off phase was initiated at Yuma Proving Ground in 
April following release of the contract solicitation.  
Three industrial firms competed in the shoot-off:   
• United Defense Limited in partnership with Royal 
Ordnance of England 
• Textron Marine and Land Systems of New Orleans 
teamed with Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering, 
Ltd. of England (VSEL)  
• Lockheed Martin Defense Systems   
The contract was awarded to the team of Textron and VSEL in 
March 1997  [Ref. 19: p. 8].    
The first major delay to the program occurred in 
December 1998 when Textron experienced internal management 
problems so significant that they novated the contract 
completely to VSEL [Ref. 19: p. 8].  The change in the 
prime contactor and associated restructuring of the 
contract resulted in a subsequent delay of 22 months in the 
production decision, from December 1999, to October 2001, 
(Ref. 10: p. 8] then another 12 months to October 2002.  
This also caused an eight-month slip to March 2005 in the 
Marine Corps Initial Fielding [Ref. 11: p. 3].  Additional 
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schedule delays in the delivery of developmental howitzers 
were caused by the need for engineering changes and 
corrective action to address problems found during 
manufacturing and initial developmental testing [Ref. 11: 
p. 5].   
The second major program delay occurred in June 2001.  
The Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Agency 
(MCOTEA) advised the program office that the developmental 
guns were inappropriate for Operational Test and Evaluation 
(OT&E).  BAE Systems2 planned for, and ultimately did, 
subcontract 70% of the howitzer’s production to 
subcontractors in the United States.  They are scheduled to 
conduct final integration and assembly of the XM777 at 
their new plant in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, beginning in 
the autumn of 2003 [Ref. 38].  MCOTEA did not feel that the 
developmental guns met the production-representative 
criteria required for IOT&E because BAE Systems produced 
them in Great Britain.  Additionally, the developmental 
guns did not include many of the design changes resulting 
from developmental testing.  As a result of MCOTEA’s 
concerns, the JPO added a 2-year Low Rate Initial 
Production (LRIP) contract in order to procure production-
representative howitzers for testing.  This slipped the 
Full-Rate Production contract 2 years and affected other 
major milestones accordingly [Ref. 12: p. 3]. 
 
                     
2
 VSEL merged with British Aerospace Public Limited Company (BAE) on 





























Scheduled Oct 2002 N/A 
Production Contract 
Award: Full Rate Dec 1999 Oct 2001 Oct 2002 Nov 2004 59 
First Production 
Article Qualification 
Testing Mar 2001 Jan 2003 Dec 2003 Apr 2004 37 
Marine Corps Initial 
Fielding Mar 2002 Nov 2003 Jul 2004 Mar 2005 36 
Army Initial Fielding Mar 2005 Mar 2005 Mar 2005 Aug 2006 17 
Table 2.   Comparison of Key Program Milestones 
Since the Original Schedule3 
 
3. Cost 
The LW155 Acquisition Strategy planned for cost relief 
through the inclusion of allies into the procurement 
process.  Both the United Kingdom and Italy participated in 
the development phase of the program.  Both countries 
provided engineers to the Joint Program Office and both 
initially planned to purchase and field approximately 65 
systems.  A trilateral Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was 
approved in March 1999 [Ref. 18: p. 6].  A production MOU, 
signed by the U.K., was pending final approval by the U.S. 
at the conclusion of this research effort.  The Italian 
Government had withdrawn from the MOU process by June of 
2003 due to program funding issues [Ref. 32]. 
Most major increases in program costs correspond with 
previously-outlined slips in the program schedule.  Re-
                     
3
 Table data is an aggregation of data from GAO Reports GAO/NSIAD-00-
182, GAO-01-603R, and GAO-02-898R 
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negotiation of the development contract when Textron 
novated to VSEL as the prime contractor, required a new 
program baseline schedule and increased program costs.  The 
overall increase was about $43 million, to a total of 
$1,129.9 million [Ref. 10: p. 6]. 







Howitzer RDT&E  $        142.6  $       162.8 $         178.5 $            35.9 
USMC Lightweight 
Howitzer and TAD 
Upgrade Production  $        492.6  $       543.0 $         621.0 $          128.4 
Army TAD Upgrade 
RDT&E  $          43.8  $         52.3 $         103.6 $            59.8 
Army Lightweight 
Howitzer and TAD 
Upgrade Production  $        450.9  $       450.9 $         462.1 $            11.2 
TOTAL  $      1,129.9  $    1,209.0 $      1,365.2 $          235.3 
Costs are Then-year dollars in millions                
Table 3.   Increases in Estimated Development and 
Production Costs of Howitzer and TAD4 
 
The development contract type was restructured from a 
cost-plus-incentive fee contract to a cost-sharing contract 
in late 2000.   This caused the USMC Lightweight Howitzer 
RDT&E funding to increase from $142.6 million to $162.8 
million.  The increases were due primarily to additional 
program requirements; risk reduction measures; cannon tube 
integration; and costs for extending the program by one 
year.  The increase in funding of $50.4 million in USMC 
Upgrade Production was due to the Marine Corps’ decision to 
exclude those costs in previous estimates.  The Army’s  
$8.5  million  increase  in  TAD  Upgrade  RDT&E  was  due  
                     
4
 Table 3 is an aggregation of data from GAO Reports GAO/NSIAD-00-
182, GAO-01-603R, and GAO-02-898R 
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to   revised   equipment   refurbishment   requirements   
for   testing   [Ref. 11: p. 6]. 
Additional costing problems were created by the 
fluctuation in the cannon barrel cost estimates provided by 
Watervliet Arsenal (WVA).  Previous to the 2001 GAO report, 
the cost of cannon barrels had fluctuated from $106,000 to 
$334,000, depending upon the workload at WVA [Ref. 11: p. 
7]. 
In April 2002, cost estimates for the overall program 
increased by $156.2 million.  Increases in the USMC 
Lightweight Howitzer RDT&E were due primarily to the 2-year 
program extension associated with the LRIP contract.  The 
USMC Howitzer and TAD Upgrade Production costs increased by 
$78 million due primarily to over 1,000 design 
modifications made to the howitzer during development.  
About $28 million were program extension costs.  The Army’s 
TAD Upgrade RDT&E costs increased by $51.3 million 
primarily due to underestimation in the complexity of 
development and integration of software [Ref. 12: p.6]. 
The Government awarded BAE Systems the LRIP contract 
in November 2002, following a successful Milestone C 
decision meeting with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(ASN) for Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA).  The 
Fixed Price Award Fee (FPAF) contract, valued at $138.9 
million, is structured to incentivize quality and schedule.  
The contract also contains a Value Engineering clause to 
share savings between the contractor and the Government 
based upon cost and complexity improvements. Watervliet 
Arsenal will provide the cannon to the contractor as 
Government Furnished Material (GFM)[Ref. 17: p. 22-23]. 
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4. Performance 
Conventional fixes to problems with strength, 
stability and accuracy of the system were almost always in 
direct competition with the weight KPP [Ref. 10: p. 19].  
As a result, designers focused changes around new materials 
and complex casting processes, as well as lengthy and 
comprehensive testing processes [Ref. 17: p. 11-17 and Ref. 
38].   
The GAO, in the course of preparing their three 
reports, ultimately identified seven technical problems.  
These were: (1) insufficient spade size, (2) flexure of the 
saddle assembly causing accuracy and bore-sight retention 
problems, (3) faulty titanium welding processes, (4) spade 
cracking, (5) faulty spade latch,  (6) spade damper that 
did not operate well in all soil types, and (7) durability 
of the optical fire control system.  MCOTEA also identified 
a number of technical issues that it felt would jeopardize 
successful completion of the IOT&E for the system. These 
issues were: (1) bore-sight retention, (2) accuracy, (3) 
durability, (4) spades, (5) design stability, (6) 
production-representative howitzers, (7) compressed test 
schedule, (8) weapon balance, and (9) logistics 
demonstration schedule and products.   As of the July 2002 
GAO Report, the program office had addressed all the 
identified technical problems through design changes, but 
all had not yet been fully field-tested.  The JPO resolved 
the non-technical issues through additional or planned 
testing and addition of the 2-year LRIP phase [Ref. 12: p. 
7].  The Operational Assessment (OA) conducted during the 
summer of 2002, fully tested and successfully addressed all 
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of the technical design issues raised by MCOTEA and the GAO 
reports.  The OA was a rigorous assessment consisting of 
three 96-hour scenarios conducted with two weapons; two 
Marine Corps crews and two Army crews; and over 5,000 
rounds fired [Ref. 18: p. 12].  In the opinion of the Joint 
Program Office, the success of the OA in proofing  out the 
design changes was a major factor in the successful 
Milestone C decision in November 2002 [Ref. 38]. 
5. Summary 
The LW155 Program will provide the Marine Corps and 
Army with a replacement towed cannon artillery system for 
the aging 155mm M198.  As with most major programs, the 
LW155 has experienced setbacks within the areas of cost, 
schedule, and performance.   These setbacks have caused an 
overall increase of almost five years to the original 
initiation of Full-Rate Production and of $235.3 million in 
costs since 1998.  However, the program successfully 
entered the Production and Deployment Phase of the 
Acquisition Life Cycle in November 2002 with a projected 
IOC for the Marine Corps in 2005 and the Army in 2006. 
C. THE ARMY ARSENAL ACT AND THE STRATTON AMENDMENT 
1. The History of Arsenals 
U.S. Army manufacturing arsenals have traditionally 
been part of the combined public and private sector 
industrial base that supports the requirements of the Army 
forces.  The first Army Arsenal, Watervliet, was 
established in 1813 to provide material support for the War 
of 1812 [Ref. 47].  However, decreases in the equipment 
requirements coupled with an increase in reliance upon the 
private sector to meet industrial needs, has significantly 
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reduced the Army’s requirements for arsenals.  At the end 
of World War II, the Army operated six manufacturing 
arsenals.  Only two remain in operation today.  The 
remaining arsenals and their primary capabilities are: 
• Rock Island Arsenal (RIA)- artillery material, 
gun carriages, and small arms. 
• Watervliet Arsenal (WVA)- seacoast gun carriages, 
railway mounts, artillery and tank gun tubes, 
mortars, and gun breeches [Ref. 9: p. 2]. 
The U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) established the U.S. 
Army TACOM (Tank-automotive Armament Command) Ground 
Systems Industrial Enterprise (GSIE) in October 2002 in an 
attempt to better manage the Army’s industrial resources.  
These resources include non-GOCO (Government-Owned 
Contractor-Operated) facilities such as RIA and WVA.  The 
long-term expectations of the GSIE program include in part: 
reduction in direct/indirect cost ratios; the establishment 
of competitive rates; the institution of “lean thinking;” 
[Ref. 55] and an integrated and optimally work-loaded 
industrial base [Ref. 46]. 
2. The Army Arsenal Act 
The statutory language that gives shape to the present 
version of the Army Arsenal Act originated in 1920 as 
Section 5a of the National Defense Act of 1916.  Section 5a 
was repealed by the Army Organization Act of 1950 and the 
language was reintroduced as Section 101(e).  Section 
101(e) was repealed in 1956 and replaced by the present 
version of the Arsenal Act codified as 10 U.S.C. Sec. 4532 
[Ref. 50: p. 6].  The act is relatively succinct, 
consisting of the following: 
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Sec 4532. Factories and Arsenals: manufacture at; 
abolition of: 
(a) The Secretary of the Army, or the Secretary of War 
prior to 1947, shall have supplies needed for the 
Department of the Army made in factories or arsenals owned 
by the United States, so far as those factories or arsenal 
can make those supplies on an economical basis. 
(b) The Secretary may abolish any United States 
arsenal that he considers unnecessary [Ref. 27]. 
The statute requires the Department of the Army (DA) to 
justify on an economic basis, the purchase of military 
supplies and equipment, from howitzers to special 
mechanic’s tools, from civilian contractors.  It is 
important to note that the Arsenal Act does not apply to 
the Marine Corps, Navy, or Air Force (except when the Air 
Corps was part if the Army prior to 1947). 
 Congressman Sanford, a member of the 59th Congress, 
made the purpose of the act relatively clear in his March 
10, 1920 remarks.  He stated "the purpose of the Act is to 
compel the executive officers of the Government to have 
Government work done at such arsenals…and to cease handing 
out appropriations to private manufacturers [Ref. 50: p. 
7]."  The Comptroller General, in 1960, reaffirmed this 
purpose with an opinion stating that arsenals should not 
lay idle if they could perform needed work at a comparable 
cost to private industry [Ref. 50: p. 7].   
 The U.S. Congress enacted legislation in 1977, 
codified in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2687, which effectively halted 
base closures by DoD and, as a result, essentially 
  19
nullified the second part of the Army Arsenal Act statute 
[Ref. 9: p. 58].  Under 10 U.S.C. Sec 2687, closure and 
realignment of any military installation in the United 
States now requires the Secretary of Defense to satisfy 
specific study and reporting requirements and to provide 
notification to Congress before proceeding [Ref. 26]. 
3. The Stratton Amendment 
The U.S. Congress enacted the Stratton Amendment (10 
U.S.C. Sec. 4542) in 1987.  It prohibits the transfer of 
technical data packages (TDPs) for large-caliber cannon to 
foreign countries. The Amendment provides that, as a 
general rule, appropriated funds may not be used to: 
(a) Transfer to a foreign country a technical data 
package for a defense item being manufactured or developed 
in an arsenal; or 
(b) to assist a foreign country in producing such a 
defense item [Ref. 28]. 
The Secretary of the Army does have the ability to make 
exceptions to the provisions of Stratton Amendment.  The 
conditions for exceptions are listed in Appendix B.   
 There are only two U.S. Government facilities 
remaining that have the capability to design large-caliber 
cannon tubes.  The first is Benet Laboratories, located at 
the previously mentioned WVA.  Benet Laboratories is a 
division of the Armament Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center (ARDEC) under TACOM.  Its primary 
capabilities include the design of tank and artillery 
cannon [Ref. 2].  The second is the Naval Surface Warfare 
Center Port Hueneme Division, Louisville Detachment, 
located at the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville (NOSL).  
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The NOSL is responsible for the technical design and 
support of U.S. Naval gun weapon systems [Ref. 21]. 
 Although the Stratton Amendment applies to “large-
caliber cannon”, it does not define the term.  However, it 
is a term generally accepted between the program and the 
engineering organizations at Picatinny Arsenal to describe 





III. PRESENTATION OF DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides historical data from the LW155 
Program with respect to the Arsenal Act and the Stratton 
Amendment.  Background on the times when the program and 
the legislation have intersected is necessary to understand 
their influence on the JPO's decision-making process.  The 
review begins with some of the pertinent laws and policies 
relating to Arsenal Act, as well as an examination of the 
recent historical guidance concerning the Arsenal Act.  
Next, it details arsenal capacity and workload issues.  It 
then transitions to the three major areas of interaction 
between the legislation in question and the LW155 Program.  
These are (1) the contract solicitation and USMC/Army 
cooperation, (2) the handling of component design and 
production under the legislation, and (3) the involvement 
of foreign governments in the design and production 
process.  This historical information on the points of 
intersection between the legislation and the LW155 Program 
provides the data and context necessary to analyze the 
JPO's actions and reactions to the legislation. 
B. LAWS, POLICIES AND REGULATIONS  
1. Executive Policy 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), under 
authority of the President of the United States, has issued 
OMB Circular No. A-76 to establish Federal policy regarding 
the performance of commercial activities. The Circular is 
often by cited by civilian contractors and Government 
officials alike for a section stating that "In the process 
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of governing, the Government shall not compete with its 
citizens."  This concept is used as the basis for 
prohibiting head-to-head competition between Government 
agencies and commercial contractors [Ref. 5: para. 4].  
However, further inspection of the actual policy and scope 
sections of the Circular reveals in part: 
…the Government shall not start or carry on any 
activity to provide a commercial product or 
service if the product or service can be procured 
more economically (emphasis added) from a 
commercial source…This Circular and its 
Supplement shall not be applicable when contrary 
to law…[Ref. 5: para. 5(c)-7(c)]. 
The OMB circular was last revised in 1999. 
2. Depot Legislation 
Although depots and arsenals are different, many of 
the functions they perform are very similar.  Therefore, it 
is important to outline some of the legislation governing 
the employment of depots.   
The Core Logistics Statute, codified in 10 U.S.C Sec. 
2464, states in part: 
It is essential for the national defense that the 
DoD maintain a core logistics capability that is 
Government-Owned and Government-Operated (GOGO) 
to ensure a ready and controlled source of 
technical competence and resources to ensure 
effective and timely response to a mobilization, 
national defense contingency situations, and 
other emergency requirements [Ref. 22: p. 4]. 
The major piece of legislation supporting the Core 
Logistics Statute is referred to as the "50/50 Law.”  10 
U.S.C. Sec 2466 requires that not more than 50% of the 
funds made available to a military department for depot 
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maintenance and repair workload may be used to contract 
with commercial firms to perform that maintenance [Ref. 22:  
p. 4].  A Report in Government Executive Magazine from 
January 2003 outlines efforts by the DoD to gain 
legislative relief from the 50/50 Law and bring depots 
under the purview of the OMB Circular A-76 guidance [Ref. 
29: p. 1]. 
3. Army Policy Concerning the Arsenal Act 
The Army has established policies and regulations 
regarding implementation of the Army Arsenal Act and the 
conduct of the required economic analysis.  The basis for 
the manner in which costs are considered in these 
regulations is derived from the Comptroller General’s 
Opinion, B-14323, issued in 1960.  The opinion defined the 
term “economic basis” in regard to the Arsenal Act as 
follows: 
Consequently, it is our further opinion that, in 
determining under this statute whether an article 
could have been produced in a Government-owned 
facility on an ‘economic basis,’ it would have 
been improper to include in the evaluation of 
such cost any amount which did not represent an 
actual expenditure by, or loss of savings to, the 
Government which was directly attributable to 
such production [Ref. 33]. 
As a result, the Army has further defined and delineated 
costing requirements that Program Management Offices must 
use and when they must use them. 
 In October 1999, the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(ASA) for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT), in 
collaboration with the ASA for Financial Management and 
Comptroller, released a Policy Memorandum titled “Army 
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Arsenals and Factories.”  The policy directed Army managers 
concerning procedures to account for direct and indirect 
cost incurred as a result of the manufacture of an item in 
a Government facility.  The arsenal is only to be held 
accountable for "out-of-pocket" costs.  These costs include 
all direct labor and material costs, but only those 
incremental indirect costs incurred for placing the 
additional work in the arsenal.  The rational is that if 
the arsenal is to be kept open, the fixed costs are 
incurred regardless of whether the arsenal is used [Ref. 
33].  In their 1997 memorandum regarding the Army Arsenal 
Act, the Office of the DoD General Counsel opined, "this 
method of comparison gives the arsenals a considerable 
advantage over private industry [Ref. 25: p. 2]." 
The Army has recently released Army Regulation (AR) 
700-90, Army Industrial Base Process, effective 3 February 
2003.  It establishes the Army’s policy for make or buy 
analysis under the Arsenal Act.  Specifically, it reserves 
the right for the ASA (ALT) to determine which articles and 
supplies arsenals can and should make, and which items will 
be subject to the make or buy analysis. It also 
incorporates policy established by the Office of the 
Secretary of the Army (OSA) memorandum dated 30 Jul 1992 
from Assistant Secretaries of the Army Conver and 
Livingstone.  The OSA memorandum set as policy:  
The Army Arsenal Statue will be implemented 
through make or buy decisions in preference to 
head-to-head competitions with private industry 
using formal solicitations.  Army facilities will 
not compete on solicitations and be evaluated 
under the Army Arsenal Statute except…in two 
instances: when the economic analysis to 
determine if it is economical to have work 
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performed in-house is inconclusive; or when a 
solicitation involves requirements that are not 
appropriate for a “make” decision, but present 
substantial subcontracting opportunities for Army 
facilities…[Ref. 29: p. 7-8]. 
The policy basically states that arsenal availability and 
viability for a program should be determined by internal 
analysis first, then a solicitation released for private 
sector sourcing if no viable arsenal source is available. 
C. ARSENAL CAPACITY AND WORKLOAD ISSUES 
Capacity utilization and Workloads at RIA and WVA, the 
only two remaining manufacturing arsenals, have declined 
substantially since the end of the cold war.  As a result, 
costs per unit have continued to escalate as fixed costs 
have been spread among decreasing amounts of workload [Ref. 
9: p. 56].   During mid-1998, officials at RIA and WVA 
estimated the following historical utilization of 
manufacturing capability: 
Fiscal Year RIA WVA 
1988 81% 100% 
1993 71% 46% 
1998 24% 17% 
Table 4.   Estimated Percentage of Total 
Manufacturing Capability Utilized at RIA and WVA 
[Ref. 9: p. 57] 
 
As of the 1999 GAO report, the arsenals reported using 
only a small portion of their available manufacturing 
capacity in the more than 3.3 million square feet of 
industrial manufacturing space.  The underutilized 
industrial capacity has contributed to higher hourly 
operating rates.  Over the 10 year period presented, the 
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hourly rates charged to customers increased by roughly 88% 
at WVA and 41% at RIA [Ref. 9: p. 57].  
While a decline in workload does not necessary lead to 
higher cost, in the case of the arsenals, both RIA and WVA 
were left with relatively fixed overhead costs, including 
the salary expenses for an increasing percentage of 
overhead employees.  For example, in 1998 WVA reported 
employing 473 overhead employees to only 409 direct labor 
employees as compared to 10 years earlier when they 
employed 1,089 direct labor employees to only 924 overhead 
employees [Ref. 9: p. 56].  The workload expressed in the 
number of direct labor hours reported by RIA from 1988 to 
1998 are presented in Table 5: 
Fiscal year Workload 
(DL hours) 
Workforce 
1988 1,944,291 2,501 
1989 Not Known 2,609 
1990 1,843,268 2,442 
1991 1,790,685 2,460 
1992 1,2029,436 2,377 
1993 1,849,193 2,289 
1994 1,583,675 2,144 
1995 1,557,574 2,033 
1996 1,258,073 1,853 
1997 1,225,849 1,730 
1998 1,140,941 1,531 
Table 5.   Reported Arsenal Workload and 
Employment Levels at RIA for Fiscal Years 1988 







D. THE PROGRAM AND THE LEGISLATION 
There have been three areas identified by the author, 
in conversation with the JPO, where the Army Arsenal Act 
and/or the Stratton Amendment have, or are anticipated to, 
intersect with the LW155 Program.  These three areas are 
addressed below. 
1. Litigation 
a. The Solicitation 
Two primary tenets of the acquisition strategy 
for the LW155 Program from its inception, were to maximize 
competition and leverage the development of existing 
competitive prototypes [Ref 15: p. 12-15].  The market 
research phase of the preparation of the solicitation, 
conducted in December 1994, resulted in the discovery of 
two existing prototype 155mm howitzers.  Royal Ordnance, 
and Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering, Ltd designed these 
existing prototypes.  Both firms resided in the United 
Kingdom.  Additionally, Lockheed Martin Defense Systems of 
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, indicated they were in the 
process of developing a prototype lightweight howitzer 
system [Ref. 19: p. 7].   
The Army, in compliance with the Arsenal Act, 
surveyed its Arsenals to identify interest in producing a 
new howitzer.  No indication of interest was received from 
any Government activity in response to the market survey 
[Ref. 51: p. 18].  As a result, the Government proceeded 
with the competitive process.  However, RIA eventually 
showed interest in developing a prototype.  They requested 
that the solicitation be amended to specifically allow 
subcontracting with DoD facilities under the provisions of 
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10 U.S.C. Sec 2208.  The Government granted their request 
[Ref. 49: p. 1 and Ref. 52: p. 2]. 
A request for proposal (RFP) was released on 10 
April 1996, soliciting offerors for a LW155.  It required 
potential competitors to present a prototype for a shoot-
off at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, 15 days later.  Those 
offerors who received shoot-off contracts would remain in 
the competition for the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) contract.  The EMD contract was to be 
awarded based in part upon the evaluated criteria of 
technical merit, past performance, and estimated immediate 
and long-term costs.  The award was to be made to the 
offeror whose proposal represented the best overall value 
to the Government [Ref. 19: p. 8]. 
Lewis Machine and Tool Company of Moline, 
Illinois, also responded to the solicitation released in 
April 1996 [Ref. 19: p. 8].  RIA, because of the inclusion 
of the previously mentioned subcontracting clause in the 
RFP, became a “major subcontractor” to Lewis Machine and 
Tool Company [Ref. 50: pg. 4].  However, the Army shortly 
thereafter disqualified Lewis Machine and Tool Company from 
the competition because they alleged: (1) RIA’s efforts 
were of such a substantial nature that they were in effect 
the prime contractor, which violated the public/private 
rules of the contract competition and (2) the proposal 
submitted by Lewis was not in compliance with the provision 
allowing DoD activities to compete for subcontracts because 
the other bidders had not been offered the opportunity to 
subcontract with RIA. [Ref. 52: p. 7].  
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The disqualification of the Lewis Machine/RIA 
team from the solicitation process set in motion a chain of 
events that resulted in two lawsuits against the U.S. 
Government involving the LW155 Program:  Lewis Machine 
concerning their disqualification, and the second by the 
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), Local 
2119, representing members of the RIA workforce and 
concerning violation of the Army Arsenal Act [Ref. 50: p. 
4].   
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia decided the first lawsuit, Lewis Machine and 
Tool Co. v. U.S. DoD, in favor of the DoD on 22 November 
1996 [Ref. 52: p. 9].   Lewis Machine and Tool Company 
appealed the decision.   The appeal was argued before the 
U.S. Court of Appeals on 10 July 1997, and once again 
decided in favor of the DoD on 6 October of that same year 
[Ref. 49: p. 2]. 
b. Army Production 
On 27 May 1993, the USMC published a Mission 
Needs Statement (MNS) for the LW155 howitzer.  The Army 
adopted the MNS on 23 September 1994.  The Army announced 
the subsequent market survey through the Commerce Business 
Daily in December of that year with respondents replying 
with capabilities statements to ARDEC.  However, it was the 
Department of the Navy, which in February 1995 authorized 
and approved funding for the transition of the process into 
the Concept Exploration and Definition phase of the federal 
acquisition process [Ref. 51: p. 18]. 
The Assistant Secretaries of the Army (ASA) and 
Navy (ASN) for Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) 
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issued a joint Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning the 
LW155 Program on 3 November 1995.  The MOA outlined the 
terms for USMC control as the Lead Service and the Army’s 
role as a Participating Service.  It addressed funding, 
program leadership, and regulatory control for the joint 
venture [Ref. 50: p. 11]. 
The Acquisition Strategy Report (ASR) outlined 
the intent to purchase 450 howitzers for the Marine Corps 
and 273 howitzers for the Army [Ref. 19: p. 7].  The Marine 
Corps later reduced the planned procurement to 377 
howitzers and the Army outlined a planned increase of 114 
systems, to a total of 378 systems, to outfit the interim 
Brigade Combat Teams [Ref. 15: p. 14].5  The intent of the 
procurement is to outfit the Marine Corps first, beginning 
with LRIP in Fiscal Year (FY) 03 and transition to split 
production for the Army and Marine Corps in FY05 [Ref. 36]. 
Members of the AFGE Local 2119 employed at RIA 
felt that the involvement of the Army in the program, and 
particularly the involvement of ARDEC in the solicitation, 
opened the program up to applicability under the Army 
Arsenal Act [Ref. 51: p. 20].  As a result, they filed a 
lawsuit with the Central District Court of Illinois against 
the DoD.  The suit, AFGE, Local 2119, et al. v. William S. 
Cohen, Secretary of Defense, et al., also involving issues 
with the acquisition of tank mounts for the M1 Abrams Tank, 
alleged violations by the Army of the Arsenal Act and 
numerous other statutes [Ref. 50: p. 5].  This was to be 
                     
5
 As of July 2003, the Army's planned increase of 114 systems to 
outfit the interim BCTs had been postponed indefinately [Ref. 32].  
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the first time in its history that the Army Arsenal Act 
would be tested in the courts [Ref. 34]. 
The AFGE lawsuit was filed on 5 March 1997.  The 
district court dismissed the action for lack of standing.  
In 1999, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part the decision of the district court. 
They held that AFGE did have standing to sue for violations 
of the Arsenal Act.  The majority of the case dealt with 
the tank mount components for the M1 Abrams Tank production 
and will be addressed in the following section.  The case 
was ultimately decided in favor of the DoD in August of 
2000 by the district court and affirmed by the court of 
appeals in August of 2001 [Ref. 50: p. 5].  Both courts 
found that the Arsenal Act did not apply to the LW155 
howitzer program.  Their rational stated that:  
Because the evidence demonstrated that the LW155 
Program was a Marine Corps program to be 
administered under the Department of the Navy’s 
acquisition regulations, the court determined 
that the Army’s Arsenal Act did not apply to 
contracting decisions for that program [Ref. 50: 
p. 5] 
Although the case was ultimately upheld at all levels in 
favor of the defendants for both the production of M1 
Abrams Tank gun mount components and the LW155 Program’s 
inapplicability under the Army’s Arsenal Act, the 
litigation lasted from March of 1997 to August of 2001.  
2. Components 
Prior to the 1992 Conver-Livingstone memorandum there 
was relatively little change or movement in guidance 
published by the DoD or DA regarding the implementation of 
the Army Arsenal Act.  However, in March of 1997, the 
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General Counsel of the DoD issued a memorandum to the DoD 
Inspector General and the Army General Counsel concerning 
the Arsenal Act.  The memorandum addressed issues with 
production of the gun mount components for the upgrade to 
the  M1A2  Main  Battle  Tank  that were  involved  in   
the  AFGE lawsuit [Ref. 25: p. 2]. 
The M1A2 upgrade program involved converting the M1A1 
tank to the M1A2 configuration by replacing the 105-
millimeter cannon with a 120-millimeter cannon and also 
making numerous other improvements to the tank [Ref. 25: p. 
1].  The memorandum held: 
In summary, the Arsenal Act does not require the 
Army to break down each system it acquires on a 
systems basis to its constituent components, 
determine whether an arsenal can provide such 
components, and then apply the Arsenal Act 
economic analysis to determine whether those 
components that an arsenal can produce in fact 
must be produced at an arsenal and furnished to 
the system prime contactor as Government-
furnished material.  On the other hand, if the 
Army has been buying a component as a separate 
item of supply, that component should be treated 
as a stand-alone supply and be subjected to an 
Arsenal Act economic analysis before its 
manufacture is shifted to the private sector 
[Ref. 25: p. 6]. 
The courts agreed on these points in their AFGE, Local 2119 
et al. decisions [Ref. 51: p. 17 and Ref. 50: p. 1]. 
The memorandum also addressed the Crusader self-
propelled artillery system.  At the time, the Crusader was 
a research and development program. The acquisition 
strategy for the program was to contract with a single 
system contractor that would be responsible for “the 
manufacturing or obtaining of components of the Crusader 
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and assembling them into the end product weapons system.”  
The DoD General Counsel outlined their position as follows: 
…if the prime contractor is responsible for 
developing and producing the entire Crusader 
system, the Army would not be bound by the 
Arsenal Act to require the contractor to produce 
component gun mounts at an Army Arsenal [Ref. 25: 
p. 5]. 
This position, also supported by the AFGE case decisions, 
clearly outlined the Army's position concerning application 
of the Arsenal Act to contracts where a prime contractor is 
responsible for procuring all components, subassemblies, 
etc., and integrating them into a functioning end item.  
The Industrial Operations Command (IOC), headquartered at 
RIA, defines this type of contract in their Make or Buy 
Decision Regulation, IOC Regulation 15-4, as a "System Buy" 
[Ref. 43: p. 2].   
 In late 1999, members of Congress expressed concern 
because the LW155 Program “failed to fully utilize the 
expertise of Army arsenals in the development and design of 
the howitzer.”  As a result, the conferees directed the 
Army and Marine Corps to develop a plan to include RIA in 
the producibility and manufacturing aspects of howitzer 
production [Ref. 19: p. 5].  The JPO responded with a 
report detailing their position.  First, they replied that 
the terms of the EMD contract (and the associated option 
for production of the first 190 howitzers) prevented DoD 
from either competing the LW155 design for production 
purposes, or directing its manufacture at RIA [Ref. 19: p. 
11].  Next, they contended that RIA could not produce the 
howitzer or components at a competitive price because of 
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the high overhead rates caused by an 83% underutilization 
rate at RIA.  Finally, they expressed their intent to 
insure RIA had every opportunity to team with the 
contractor and produce substantial parts of the LW155, but 
they would not mandate an RIA role.  The contractor would 
be allowed to pursue a “best value” approach for selection 
of its subcontractors.  The JPO believed the “best value” 
approach leveraged the advantages of competition to provide 
a quality product at the lowest cost [Ref. 19: p. 13-14]. 
3. Foreign Involvement 
The Army's regulation governing the Army Industrial 
Base Process, AR 700-90, addresses foreign military sales 
(FMS).  The regulation states:   
Proposed FMS, co-production programs and 
transfers of certain technical data to foreign 
nations must include an Industrial Capabilities 
Assessment (ICA) prior to approval.  The purpose 
is to ensure such proposals do not undermine the 
industrial base goal of maintaining technological 
superiority over potential adversaries (emphasis 
added)[Ref. 45: p. 6].  
The technological superiority referred to in the regulation 
applies to TDPs for large-caliber cannon, as addressed in 
the Stratton Amendment.  The Stratton Amendment, as 
outlined in both the previous chapter and Appendix B, 
prohibits the transfer of TDPs for large-caliber cannon to 
foreign countries except when specific exception criteria 
are met and approved by the Secretary of the Army  [Ref. 
28].   
Benet Laboratories, the U.S. Government research and 
development laboratory located at WVA, designed the cannon 
assembly for the LW155 [Ref. 37].  The JPO conducted a 
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cost/benefit analysis in June of 2000 in response to 
congressional requests to consider NOSL as a producer for 
the cannon assembly.  The JPO determined that both WVA and 
NOSL could produce the cannon assembly for comparatively 
close costs.  However, NOSL had a higher technical and 
schedule risk than WVA [Ref. 16: p. 3, 13].  As a result, 
the JPO plans to provide the cannon assembly produced by 
WVA to the prime contractor as GFM [Ref. 36]. 
In mid-2002, the LW155 JPO was in the process of 
preparing for a Milestone C decision.  WVA, the producer of 
the tube, had increased the per unit price of the cannon 
assembly over previous estimates by approximately $100,000.  
The reason for the price increase was the anticipated 
under-funding of WVA with respect to the levels required by 
the Industrial Mobilization Capacity (IMC) Program [Ref. 
39].  The IMC Program, formerly known as the Unutilized 
Plant Capacity (UPC) Program, requires the Army to maintain 
idle manufacturing capacity to offset possible industrial 
mobilization deficiencies in the private sector.  Although 
these costs are separately programmed and budgeted, they 
are paid from the Defense Working Capital Fund, Army 
(DWCFA) if the capacity is idle more than 20% in any one 
month, but used at least once during the year [Ref. 45: p. 
12].  Because WVA is required under the DCWFA procedures to 
pass costs on to their customers, the under-funding of WVA 
would cause an increase in overhead charges to their 
customers in order to cover those costs.  Congress 
appropriates the IMC funding on an annual basis [Ref. 23: 
p. 1].  Army Headquarters determines the distribution of 
the funds among the various arsenals.  WVA had expected, as 
had been the case in recent years, to receive only about 
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25% of the $12-14 million needed to cover IMC requirements.  
However, Congress eventually committed increased funding 
[Ref. 23: p. 1] and the Army agreed to fully fund WVA's IMC 
needs.  The IMC funding increases were not earmarked 
specifically for production of the LW155 cannon assemblies, 
but rather to compensate for the increased cost associated 
with maintaining required additional arsenal-wide 
mobilization capacity.  However, the commitment to fully 
fund WVA’s IMC Program reduced the amount of overhead costs 
allocated to the LW155 Program and therefore reduced the 
projected unit price of the cannon assembly back into the 
affordable range [Ref. 36]. 
 The LW155 is currently the only lightweight towed 
howitzer system under development within NATO.  The LW155 
Program strategy was built on the basis of leveraging 
existing technology in allied nations.  As a result, the 
JPO solicited international interest early in the program.  
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy signed a 
MOU in 1999 covering the development of the LW155 [Ref. 15: 
p. 15-16].  As late as May 2003, all three countries were 
in the final stages of staffing a production MOU [Ref. 38].  
Both foreign countries indicated their plans to purchase 
their entire production quantities from the BAE Systems 
team.  This strategy of teaming with allied nations helps 
to reduce the cost of individual howitzers through 
economies of scale.  The number of howitzers to be 
purchased by Italy, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. as of 







% of Total 
Systems 
Italy 70 8% 
United Kingdom 65 7% 
U.S.  769 85% 
Marine Corps 377 42%
Army 273 30%
Army BCTs planned 114 13%
Total 899 100% 
Table 6.   Planned Purchase from BAE Systems with 
Army BCTs Included as of July 2002 [Ref. 15: p. 
14] 
 
In addition to the cannon assembly, Benet Laboratories 
also designed the Primer Feed Mechanism (PFM) for the 
weapon [Ref. 37]. The production of this component has 
caused potential points of contention between the JPO and 
WVA that will be addressed in greater detail in the next 
chapter.  
The number of systems detailed above included the 
anticipated additional purchase of systems by the Army for 
employment with the new Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).  As 
stated earlier, the Army eventually postponed the funding 
for the planned purchase of 114 additional systems.  
Additionally, the Italian Ministry of Defense withdrew from 
the production MOU negotiations due to funding problems.  
The revised scheduled purchases, taking into account the 
recent developments concerning the BCTs and the Italians, 








% of Total 
Systems 
United Kingdom 65 9% 
U.S.  650 91% 
Marine Corps 377 53%
Army 273 38%
Total 715 100% 
Table 7.   Planned Purchase from BAE Systems 
without Italians or Army BCTs [Ref. 15: p. 14] 
 
The decrease in the number of systems purchased by the Army 
and the removal of the Italians as a purchaser changes the 
percentage of the total systems purchased by the U.S. and 
the United Kingdom [Ref. 15: p. 14].  
The Italian Government, since their inclusion in the 
program, had expressed a desire to co-produce the cannon 
tube for the LW155 howitzer.  However, the Stratton 
Amendment prohibits the U.S. from providing the necessary 
TDPs to the Italian Government.  As a result, the Italian 
Government had decided (before their withdrawal from the 
program) to absorb the expense necessary to develop and 





The previous chapter presented the facts surrounding 
the events when the Army Arsenal Act and the Stratton 
Amendment interacted with the LW155 Program.  This chapter 
will present an analysis of the following: 
• Why this interaction occurred 
• How the JPO reacted to the interaction 
• What were the ramifications to the program of the 
interaction and the JPO's reactions 
We will begin with a macro-level analysis of conditions in 
the post-Cold War environment that precipitated interaction 
between the Legislation and the LW155 Program.  The 
analysis will then transition to the program, or micro-
level.  The micro-level analysis will address the finer 
points of the interaction with respect to the case law, 
components, and foreign involvement in design and 
production. 
B. THE MACRO-LEVEL:  A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AFTER THE 
COLD WAR 
The end of the Cold War has had a marked effect on 
both the public and private arenas of the defense industry 
in the United States.  There are countless scholars and 
practitioners who have written in length about this matter.  
As an example, The Council on Foreign Relations published a 
collection of 15 essays by Council members that were wholly 
devoted to issues of the defense industrial base 
transformation in the post-Cold War era [Ref. 20: p. xiii].  
Although the future and direction of the defense industrial 
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base are both important and controversial, they will not be 
debated here.  Rather, this portion of the analysis will 
examine how the post-Cold War downsizing within the defense 
industry, with regard to protectionist legislation, such as 
the Army Arsenal Act and the Stratton Amendment, impacted 
all programs in general and the LW155 Program in 
particular. 
1. Competing Stakeholders 
The pluralistic governmental process indicative of our 
democratic society can lead to laws and policies that 
conflict in spirit, if not in language.  This is often due, 
in the author's opinion, to the influence of the different 
stakeholders involved in the process of policy creation, 
interpretation, and enforcement.  The interaction of 
stakeholders is particularly evident in situations where 
the environment encompassing an issue is changing.  An 
excellent example of this dichotomy in legislation and 
policy is the recent controversy over the 50/50 Law for the 
work loading of military depots presented in Chapter II.  
The intent of the federal policy in OMB Cir. A-76 is to 
allow the private sector to perform those functions it can 
do more efficiently than the Government [Ref. 5: para. 
4(a)].  Manufacturing and repair of military equipment 
would certainly fall under the purview of this policy.  
However, Congress has enacted legislation, in the form of 
the Core Logistics Statue and the 50/50 Law that keeps 
workload within depots, albeit for reasons of national 
security, regardless of comparable efficiency available 
within the private sector.  The major stakeholders are as 
follows: 
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• The politicians representing the local economies 
supported by the depots 
• The politicians representing the local economies 
supported by the private firms capable of 
performing the depot work 
• The Military Services (DoD) required to fund 
depot work 
• The depot workers (AFGE) 
• The private firms 
Each of these stakeholders has vested interest in 
seeing current laws and policies either changed or 
maintained.   
The DoD's recent effort to repeal the 50/50 Law is 
indicative of the larger issue of changing priorities.  The 
once overwhelming priority to ensure long-term capability 
internal to the Government has been mitigated by the 
immense pressure to reduce defense spending and adopt what 
is viewed as commercial efficiency.   
If successful, the repeal would make the depots and 
depot workers subject to the outsourcing processes outlined 
in OMB Cir. A-76.  However, before the draft legislation 
even left OMB, both the president of the AFGE and 
Representative Solomon Ortiz, D-Texas, the ranking member 
of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee and a member with a depot in his district, vowed 
to fight the proposal [Ref. 30: p. 1-2].   
The private defense firms capable of performing the 
work also have a vested interest in the success of the 
repeal.  RADM (Ret.) Don Eaton, former Deputy Commander of 
Logistics and Fleet Support (Navy/Marine Corps Aviation) 
from 1991 to 1994, attended a meeting regarding Depot work 
  42
in May of 1992, with the president of the Aerospace 
Industrial Association (AIA) in attendance, at their 
Washington, D.C. headquarters.  The AIA, representing the 
aviation defense contractors, expressed their desire to 
have depot work directed to their industry.  They divulged 
their need for a funding stream to support the aviation 
defense industrial base.  Their need arose because the 
manufacturing funding streams, supported by Cold War era 
DoD procurements, had diminished to the point they could no 
longer sustain their current research, work force, and 
plant infrastructure levels [Ref. 14].  Therefore, one 
could also certainly expect the defense industry firms 
poised to benefit from the additional outsourcing in the 
current DoD repeal effort to lobby members of Congress for 
passage of the proposal.   
Although this is an example of depot legislation 
rather than arsenal legislation, it presents a relevant 
case of how proponents of outsourcing and the forces 
protecting the GOGO facilities (1) have conflicting agendas 
and, (2) have reacted to the post-Cold War downsizing of 
the defense industry.  In fact, the stakeholders are so 
similar that you could simply remove the word "depot" from 
the stakeholders listed earlier and replace it with the 
word "arsenal." 
2. The Downward Spiral for Arsenals 
A significant portion of a PM's perceived success or 
failure is his or her ability to control costs.  Treating 
Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) has become an 
important aspect of the PM's daily life in the post-Cold 
War era of acquisition reform [Ref. 4: p. 4].  
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Unfortunately, as presented in previous chapters, the 
importance of arsenals as a manufacturing source has 
declined since the end of the Cold War.  When work was 
plentiful for both the arsenals and the private sector 
during the Cold War years, the allocation of work in 
accordance with the Arsenal Act was not an issue.  However, 
defense downsizing substantially reduced the amount of 
arsenal-type work needed.  According to the GAO, the 
declining workload figures from 1993 to 1998, presented in 
Table 5, are evidence of both defense downsizing and 
increased reliance upon the private sector to meet the 
Government's needs [Ref. 9: p. 58].  As the workload 
decreases, the amount of the arsenal's fixed costs 
allocated to each unit of production increases, making the 
arsenals less attractive to the cost-conscious PMs.   
One could attempt to blame the arsenals for their own 
demise for failing to respond as quickly to market forces 
as their private competitors.  However, in many cases the 
arsenal managers do not determine their own fate.  The Army 
Headquarters often controls the approval, disapproval, and 
funding of decisions regarding staffing levels and 
adjustment incentive programs such as early retirement and 
early resignation [Ref. 9: p. 59].   
3. The Result 
One major result of these changes in the utilization 
of arsenals since the end of the Cold War is an emphasis by 
the stakeholders concerned, namely the Congressional 
members from the affected districts and the AFGE union 
representing the arsenal employees, on retaining jobs.  The 
arsenals, like the depots, have not been able to 
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successfully compete with the private contractors in terms 
of cost.  As a result, the proponents of arsenals have 
turned to alternative strategies for maintaining workload.  
C. THE BRIDGE FROM MACRO-LEVEL TO MICRO-LEVEL 
In order to understand why the Arsenal Act became 
important to the LW155 Program, we must return all the way 
back to 1993-1994, when the USMC and the Army published and 
codified the MNS for the LW155 howitzer.  The employees at 
RIA likely did not enter the decade of the 1990s with the 
expressed intent to derail the LW155 Program.  Likewise, 
when the MNS was published by the USMC and adopted by the 
Army in 1993-1994, they did not scheme to deny RIA access 
to the program.  On the contrary, it is the opinion of the 
author that the events that followed:  the lawsuits, the 
congressional interest and inquiries, and the GAO 
investigations, were an unfortunate manifestation of both 
RIA's stakeholders and the JPO trying to work within their 
constraints, as best they could, in order to successfully 
operate in the post-Cold War environment.   
The author has been unable to obtain information to 
explain why RIA had developed a prototype howitzer, but 
showed no interest in producing it for the Army when the 
market survey was announced by ARDEC in the Commerce 
Business Daily (CBD) in December of 1994.  However, this 
fact is part of the court record [Ref. 51: p. 18], and this 
researcher could not locate any attempt by RIA or Lewis 
Machine and Tool Co. to argue on this point.  As stated 
earlier in Chapter II, any interest shown by RIA would have 
evoked an economic analysis in accordance with the Army 
Arsenal Act.  Furthermore, the Conver-Livingstone 
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Memorandum dated 30 July 1992, clearly stated that make or 
buy decisions were preferred to head-to-head competitions 
with private industry.  One can assume then, barring any 
unusual circumstances, that a decision regarding production 
by RIA would have been settled very early in the LW155 
acquisition process. 
If an economic analysis in the form of a make or buy 
decision had occurred, RIA would likely have experienced a 
considerable advantage over private industry competitors as 
opined by the DoD General Counsel in their 1997 Memorandum 
regarding the Arsenal Act.  According to current policy set 
by the Comptroller General in 1960, the arsenal could only 
be held accountable for "out-of-pocket" costs during the 
make or buy analysis.  However, the arsenals are mission-
funded and therefore are required to pass all of their 
anticipated costs to their customers.  As a result, the 
LW155 program would ultimately have to pay greater costs 
than those utilized during the make or buy analysis to 
select the arsenal over the private competitors.   
One possible explanation for RIA's failure to respond 
to the market survey is that they simply failed to read the 
CBD that day.  However, a much more plausible explanation 
is a failure on their part to grasp the degree or speed of 
the impending decline in future business that would 
precipitously drop their capacity utilization from 81% in 
the Cold War year of 1988 to a dismal 24% within a mere ten 
years (see Table 4).  Between the end of the Cold War and 
1993, the estimated capacity utilization at RIA had dropped 
less than ten percent. Furthermore, there was actually a 
spike in the workload in FY92 and FY93 where the amount of 
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workload at RIA was higher than it had been in the five 
previous years.  Figure 1 provides a graphical 












Figure 1.   Reported Arsenal Workload Levels for 
Fiscal Years 1988 through 1998 [Ref. 9: p. 57]6 
 
 Additionally, RIA may have been forecasting future 
work, such as the M1 Abrams Tank mounts, that was 
subsequently cancelled.  Therefore, it is completely 
possible that the Army's leadership and the leadership at 
RIA felt, as evidenced by recent workload spikes, there 
would be enough work in the future to allow them to safely 
forego involvement in the LW155 Program. 
Between the market survey in early FY94 and the 
release of the RFP in the middle of FY96, RIA reversed 
                     
6
 Data is derived from GAO Report GAO/NSIAD-99-31.  Data for 1989 is 
an estimation by interpolation because direct labor hours were not 
available from RIA. 







































their position concerning their interest in the LW155 
acquisition.  The workload level at RIA had dropped by 
almost 40% from their spike just four years earlier (see 
Figure 1).  Capacity utilization was also on the sharp 
decline.  The capacity utilization data for RIA from Table 
4 is represented graphically in Figure 2 below.  While data 
were only available for the three points shown, the much 












Figure 2.   Capacity Utilization at RIA from FY1988 
to 1998 as a Percentage of Total Manufacturing 
Capacity Available [Ref. 9: p. 57] 
 
This researcher believes RIA's realization of the 
impending decreases in workload and capacity utilization 
led to their request and successful bid to have the 
solicitation amended to allow them to serve as 
subcontractor to Lewis Machine and Tool Company.  More 






































importantly, this provides a plausible reason as to why the 
LW155 Program and the Arsenal Act legislation eventually 
intersected. 
D. THE MICRO-LEVEL:  THE ARSENAL ACT, THE STRATTON 
AMENDMENT, AND THE PROGRAM 
The previous sections established a plausible 
explanation concerning why RIA ultimately became interested 
in the LW155 Program, but that is not nearly as important 
as the eventual result of their interest.  This section 
will present the interaction that occurred and how it 
related to the legislation, how the JPO reacted, and the 
ramifications of their reactions. 
1. Litigation 
Although RIA was not a plaintiff in the Lewis Machine 
and Tool Co. lawsuit, they certainly had a vested interest 
in the outcome.  In fact, Lewis' disqualification occurred 
because their entry was entirely RIA's prototype howitzer.  
This was admittedly not an Arsenal Act case.  However, it 
is the belief of this researcher that the failure of Lewis 
to prevail resulted in the inclusion of the LW155 Program 
in the AFGE lawsuit. The AFGE lawsuit against the DoD 
concerned the M1 Abrams Tank mounts and was an Arsenal Act 
case. 
a. The Interaction 
The Lewis case was filed in May of 1996, shortly 
after they were disqualified from the EMD contract 
solicitation process.  The U.S. District Court decided the 
case in favor of the Government on 22 November 1996.  Less 
than four months later, the AFGE filed their lawsuit 
against the DoD claiming violation of the Arsenal Act with 
relation to the LW155 Program.  Just four months later, the 
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courts began hearing Lewis' appeal.  The stakeholders for 
RIA were, in effect, waging a two-pronged attack against 
the LW155 Program.   
b. The Reaction 
On both accounts, the JPO for the LW155 chose to 
defend their position rather than admit wrongdoing and 
submit to the plaintiffs.  
c. The Results and the Ramifications 
An important ramification of the decision to 
fight the Lewis lawsuit was the inclusion of the LW155 
Program in the AFGE lawsuit.  As a result, the LW155 
Program was involved in almost continuous litigation from 
May of 1996 to August of 2001.  Had the JPO found a way to 
award the contract to Lewis, they certainly would not have 
been included in the AFGE lawsuit.  Although the JPO did 
not track the monetary costs of the litigation, it stands 
to reason that many salaried employees from the JPO and the 
supporting ARDEC legal office devoted significant time and 
resources to preparing for the litigation.  Additionally, 
from a qualitative standpoint, their involvement in 
litigation likely lent an air of stress and uncertainty to 
decisions affecting the program's future.  While these 
ramifications cannot be quantified, they certainly had at 
least some bearing on the quality of the JPO leadership's 
decisions. 
Another important ramification to the LW155 
Program occurred as the courts decided in favor of the 
Government and began transitioning into the appeals 
process.  It is the belief of this researcher that the 
increased amount of Congressional interest in the program 
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was a result of the gradual realization that RIA would not 
secure the contract through a favorable Arsenal Act 
decision.  This interest was manifested in the 1999 
Congressional requirement to include RIA in producibility 
and manufacturing aspects of the LW155 and the 
Congressional request to GAO to report on and monitor the 
program for cost, schedule, and performance difficulties.  
If Congress could force the inclusion of RIA in the early 
production planning for the LW155 system, they would likely 
have a better chance of securing subcontracts related to 
that planning.  In addition, as stated in the previous 
chapter, the LW155 was the only howitzer of its type 
planned throughout NATO.  The M198 fleet of howitzers, 
currently used by the USMC and Army, was nearing the end of 
its usable life.  RIA produced the M198.  If the LW155 
Program were cancelled because of issues publicized during 
the GAO Reports to Congress, RIA would likely secure 
substantial work associated with a remanufacture or 
refurbishment contract for the M198.   
However, from the Army's point of view the 
courts, as a result of the litigation, established two 
important case law precedents.  The first, as a result of 
the Lewis case, validated Army policy concerning make or 
buy decisions outlined in the Conver-Livingstone 
memorandum.  The policy stipulated that make or buy 
decisions previous to the release of a solicitation were 
the rule, whereas head-to-head competition with private 
industry would be the exception.  The second, as a result 
of the AFGE case, provided an important precedent both for 
the LW155 Program in the future and joint programs in 
general.  As detailed in Chapter III, the USMC and Army had 
  51
fluctuated in the number of systems they intended to 
procure.  The planned purchases varied by as much as one 
hundred LW155 systems per Service since the program's 
inception.  It is even conceivable that the Army could 
ultimately purchase more systems than the Marine Corps.  
However, the courts determined that the 1995 MOA between 
the Navy and Army was sufficient proof of their intent 
early in the program for the Navy to lead the acquisition.  
The courts focused on the documented intent, not the 
evolution, of the procurement.  The court decisions 
provided a powerful show of support for JPOs as the DoD 
increasingly focuses on joint requirements and programs for 
future military systems [Ref 3: p. A-1]. 
Another positive result, from the program 
perspective, was the successful Milestone C decision in 
November of 2002.  The JPO suffered intense scrutiny during 
the GAO reviews.  However, the Deputy Program Manager 
ultimately credits increased attention on the program's 
robust testing procedures and successes within the third 
GAO Report, published in 2001, with contributing to that 
successful decision [Ref. 38]. 
In summary, the ramifications of the litigation 
surrounding the LW155 Program were both negative and 
positive from the JPO's perspective: 
Negative 
• Continuous litigation was costly to the program 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms 
• The anticipated failure of the suits led to 





• Established legal precedent supporting the Army's 
Conver-Livingstone Policy regarding 
implementation of the Arsenal Act 
• Established legal precedent to protect MOAs 
between Services for Joint Programs from 
retroactive attacks under the purview of the 
Arsenal Act 
• GAO attention actually contributed to a 
successful Milestone C decision 
2. Components 
The  interaction  between the  LW155  Program and the 
Arsenal Act concerning howitzer components actually 
occurred as a result of the AFGE decisions regarding the M1 
Abrams Tank upgrade program.  The LW155 JPO was the 
fortunate recipient of the legal precedent set by the 
courts. The AFGE decision validated the DoD's position 
expressed in the 1992 General Counsel of the DoD 
Memorandum.  The courts determined that, in a "System Buy" 
type contract, the individual components were not subject 
to make or buy analysis under the Army Arsenal Act unless 
the components were initially to be provided as GFM to the 
contractor [Ref. 50: p. 10]. 
a. The Interaction 
The interaction between the legislation and the 
program occurred when Congress, in late 1999, required the 
JPO to "develop a plan to include RIA in producibility and 
manufacturing aspects of howitzer production, including 
recoil mechanisms and carriages for the LW155 Program [Ref. 
48]."  As argued in the previous section, this would 
certainly have given an advantage in securing future 
subcontracts and/or the eventual production contract, to 
RIA.  It is important to note here that Congress never 
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mentioned the Arsenal Act in their Conference Report 
directing the RIA inclusion.  This may have been due to 
growing pessimism over AFGE's chance for success in their 
pending suit. 
b. The Reaction 
The JPO's reaction was to respond to the 
Congressional directive with the Report to the Senate and 
House Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense regarding a 
plan for Utilization of Rock Island Arsenal.  The Report 
outlined their intent to include RIA in development 
planning for production and manufacturing due to RIAs 
experience in these areas.  It also stated that RIA would 
be given the opportunity to compete with industry for 
production and/or future work on the LW155.  However, the 
JPO made clear their intent to allow the prime contractor 
to pursue a "best value" approach for selection of 
subcontractors without interference from the JPO.  The 
report also pointed out that the terms and conditions 
within the current contract with BAE would likely make a 
production contract with any other source extremely costly, 
as well as reiterating the effect on RIA's cost-
competitiveness caused by low capacity utilization [Ref. 
19: p. 13-14].  All of these points by the JPO reinforced 
that while RIA would be given the same opportunities as any 
other competitor, it was highly unlikely they would have 
much success securing substantial contract work for the 
LW155. 
c. The Results and the Ramifications 
The U.S. District Court rendered their decision 
in favor of the Government in the AFGE suit on 23 August 
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2000 [Ref. 50: p. 5].  This was less than nine months after 
Congress ordered the report regarding a plan for 
utilization of RIA.  The court's decision affirmed the 
Army's policies regarding components under "System Buy" 
contracts.  In fact, the court's decision effectively 
established the Army's position as a legal precedent.  This 
precedent strengthened the LW155's position regarding their 
treatment of components under the contract and their 
position regarding competition by RIA for future work.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the ramification to the 
LW155 Program regarding treatment of components under the 
Arsenal Act was a positive one. 
It is important to mention at this time that the 
AFGE court decision also established that the LW155 Program 
was a Department of the Navy (DoN) Program administered 
under DoN acquisition regulations and therefore not subject 
to the Army Arsenal Act [Ref. 51: p. 20-22].  However, when 
the JPO was making decisions and establishing their 
position regarding RIAs involvement, they did not yet know 
the outcome of the AFGE suit.  Had the courts decided with 
the M1 Abrams Tank Program concerning components, but 
against the LW155 Program concerning applicability of the 
Arsenal Act, the JPO would still have been validated in 
their position concerning components. 
3. Foreign Involvement 
The Stratton Amendment is intended to prevent the 
transfer of superior technology, specifically related to 
large-caliber cannons, to potential adversaries.  One would 
wholly expect the amendment to have bearing in the 
production of a howitzer such as the LW155.  This section 
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will analyze two areas where the provisions of the Stratton 
Amendment influenced the program.  These are (1) the desire 
by the Italians to produce their own cannon assembly, and 
(2) issues concerning cannon assembly pricing by WVA.  
Additionally, this analysis will explore issues concerning 
the Primer Feed Mechanism (PFM), designed at WVA, which 
never came to fruition, but illustrate possible problems 
for future programs with respect to the Stratton Amendment. 
a. The Interaction 
Italian Production:  The first point of 
interaction concerning foreign involvement and the Stratton 
Amendment occurred with the Italians.  The Italian 
Government, as detailed in the previous chapter, wanted to 
maintain the capability within their own borders to produce 
cannon assemblies for their LW155s. Therefore, they decided 
to design, engineer, develop, and manufacture their own 
cannon assembly. 
WVA Pricing:  As presented in the previous 
chapter, WVA was experiencing trouble securing IMC Program 
funding while the JPO was involved in preparation for a 
Milestone C decision.  The resultant increase in price due 
to the increased overhead was approximately $100,000 per 
cannon assembly.  Using the number of planned systems 
presented in the July, 2002 ASR (see Table 6): 
899 Total Systems X $100,000 = $89.9 million 
The projected total procurement cost, as of April 2002, was 
$1,365.2 million (see Table 3).  The $89.9 million would 
equate to an increase of just over six percent to the 
projected total cost of the procurement.   
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b. The Reaction 
Italian Production:  The members of the JPO 
leadership believed they had no choice but to allow the 
Italian Government to produce their own cannon assemblies.  
They felt that even if the Italians could qualify for an 
exception under the Stratton Amendment, the Secretary of 
the Army would not look favorably upon giving up control of 
the technology [Ref. Shields 02may03]. 
WVA Pricing:  The JPO had weathered three GAO 
audits between July of 2000 and July of 2002.  The reports 
had detailed total program cost increases of $235.3 million 
over that time period (see Table 3).  The leadership of the 
program certainly did not want to report an additional 
projected increase of almost $90 million in procurement 
funding at the Milestone C decision review in November 
2002, less than six months after the last GAO Report.  
Furthermore, since the LW155 program was essentially a USMC 
program, the DoN and the JPO did not want to shoulder the 
financial burden of supporting another Service's IMC 
Program requirements.  As a result, the Navy Acquisition 
Executive entered an agreement with the Army to exempt the 
USMC production, beginning in FY03, from IMC related costs 
[Ref. 39]. 
Additionally, the JPO had already ruled out NOSL, 
the only other Government facility with the capability to 
produce large-caliber cannon tubes, as a potential 
supplier.  Their costs had been comparable to WVA's, but 
the JPO determined that their technical and schedule risk 
was much higher [Ref. 16: p. 3,13].  This decision, coupled 
with the Stratton Amendment requirement for a U.S. 
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producer, had forced the JPO into what was essentially a 
sole-source arrangement with WVA.  The JPO presented their 
case to the Army's Acquisition leadership in order to 
obtain relief for WVA [Ref. 36].   
c. The Results and the Ramification 
Italian Production:  The seventy LW155 systems 
planned for purchase by the Italians composed eight percent 
of the total purchase (see Table 6).  One could make the 
assumption that if the Italians planed to outfit the LW155 
with their own cannon assembly, they did not intend to pay 
for the assemblies produced by WVA.  This would result in a 
higher cost per unit for WVA that would ultimately be 
passed to all purchasing Services and countries.  
Additionally, future cannon assembly production throughout 
the life cycle of the weapon system would also be reduced.   
There exists another, more disturbing 
ramification from the decision forcing the Italians to 
produce their own cannon assembly.  At the time the JPO was 
dealing with these considerations, the combined Italian and 
United Kingdom purchases comprised a full 15% of planned 
purchases (see Table 6).  The British intended to buy their 
sixty-five LW155 systems, in their entirety, from the BAE 
Systems team.  However, if the Italians produced a 
different cannon assembly, the British would then 
theoretically have a choice as to their supplier [Ref. 38].  
This essentially shifts control from the JPO to the British 
Government with respect to the cannon assembly sourcing.  
Additionally, there was the possibility of loss of funding 
streams from both foreign partners with respect to the 
cannon assembly.   
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If WVA were allowed to license the TDPs to the 
Italians, this would result in a better situation for both 
parties.  First, the Italian Government may have decided 
they did not need to actually establish the production 
capability for the cannon assemblies as long as they had 
the technology in their possession.  This decision would 
save the Italians the significant funding outlays and 
potential schedule delays necessary for the development and 
manufacture of another cannon assembly.  In addition, WVA 
would maintain all current planned production.  Even if the 
Italians still chose to produce the assemblies developed by 
WVA, WVA could maintain a funding stream through licensing.  
Second, the JPO and WVA would not be susceptible to the 
uncertainty in production quantities caused by the United 
Kingdom’s ability to change suppliers.  
WVA Pricing:  The JPO was at the mercy of the 
WVA's funding issues as a result of the sole-source 
arrangement that had evolved due to technical capabilities 
and Stratton Amendment requirements.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Army (with funding support from 
Congress) eventually agreed to fully fund WVA's IMC Program 
requirements.   
This researcher believes that a petition for the 
infusion any significant additional procurement funding 
into the LW155 program would have been considered the least 
favorable option for the JPO.  Scrutiny from stakeholders 
resulting from the RIA litigation issues addressed earlier 
had centered Congressional attention on the program.  This 
forced  the  JPO  to  rely  on  WVA,  the  Army,  and  the  
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Arsenal's  allies  in  Congress  to  secure  a  solution  
to  the  IMC  Program  issues.   
Although the funding requirement would be the 
same regardless of whether the LW155 Program or WVA 
received it, the perception of more funding shortfalls in 
the LW155 Program would have had a greater negative impact 
on the Program.  The JPO's requirement would be viewed as a 
$90 million increase in procurement funds needing 
Congressional approval, whereas a funding increase for WVA 
would be viewed as an annual nine to ten million-dollar 
investment in the entire defense mobilization base where 
the LW155 program is a relatively minor player.  However, 
WVA will have to continue to receive the required IMC 
Program commitment from Congress and the Army for the life 
of the procurement.  Otherwise, the threat of cost spikes 
exists when the Army production of LW155 howitzers begins 
in FY05 and they will continue until the completion of 
production in FY08.   
d. The Primer Feed Mechanism (PFM) 
The Stratton Amendment, as previously mentioned, 
prohibits the transfer of TDPs for large-caliber cannon.  
However, the statute does not specifically detail what 
constitutes the "cannon."  Furthermore, as of August 2003, 
there was no relevant case law dealing with application of 
the Stratton Amendment [Ref. 34].  This is significant 
because a law that has not been tested is much less bounded 
and defined than one, such as the Arsenal Act, that has 
seen scrutiny by the courts.  As a result, a program office 
has more freedom of interpretation when establishing their 
position with respect to the law.   
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Benet Laboratory at WVA developed the PFM.  The 
PFM is a magazine device designed to feed explosive primers 
into the breechblock at the rear of the cannon tube.  The 
program office contends that the PFM is new technology that 
is not part of the "cannon."  Benet Laboratories contends 
that because the PFM was developed at WVA, it is subject to 
the Stratton Amendment.  The JPO does not agree with their 
contention concerning the cause/effect relationship.  In 
other words, they do believe that just because something is 
developed at WVA, the Stratton Amendment automatically 
covers it [Ref. 37].   
There is no longer an active issue concerning the 
PFM.  WVA was able to price the PFM within five percent of 
commercial quotes.  The program office felt this, coupled 
with the reduced risk associated with integrating the PFM 
with the breech during manufacture, justified purchase from 
WVA.  However, the JPO contends that a substantial price 
difference with commercial quotes would have led them to 
search globally for a supplier [Ref. 31].  This would 
likely have result in a challenge by WVA or its 
stakeholders for violation of the Stratton Amendment that 
would result in the eventual creation of the first case law 
precedent for the Stratton Amendment. 
e. BAE Systems' Answer to the Stratton 
Amendment 
In 2003, BAE Systems informed the JPO of their 
intent to establish a U.S. subsidiary to contract for full-
rate production [Ref. 31].  As a result, the subsidiary 
will be considered a U.S. firm, not a foreign one.  While 
their reasoning was not made available at the time this MBA 
Project was published, BAE Systems likely explored many 
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benefits to creating a U.S. subsidiary.  Relief from the 
export limitations of the Stratton Amendment for future 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The post-Cold War era of decreasing defense budget and 
increased emphasis on joint capabilities among the Services 
make it imperative that PMs stay attuned to the 
requirements, limitations, and restrictions caused by 
protectionist legislation such as the Army Arsenal Act and 
the Stratton Amendment.   
1. Primary Research Question Review 
• What is the impact of the Army Arsenal Act (10 
U.S.C. 4532) of 1920 and the Stratton Amendment 
(10 U.S.C. 4542) of 1986 upon the development and 
procurement of Department of Defense (DoD) Weapon 
Systems such as the LW155? 
The end of the Cold War ushered in changing priorities 
from the senior leadership of DoD.  Focus on cost savings 
and efficiency has increased as the DoD's portion of the 
Federal budget has decreased.  Private industry, able to 
adapt faster to changes in the environment, coupled with a 
policy focused on contracting out manufacturing work to the 
private sector, has dramatically reduced the work available 
to manufacturing arsenals.  The decrease in available work 
at the arsenals has caused higher overhead rates.  The 
higher rates result in less work from the cost-conscious 
Program Managers within DoD.  As a consequence, a vicious 
downward spiral in capacity utilization and workload has 
led to arsenals that are not cost-competitive with 
industry.  The arsenals and their stakeholders are then 
left to find other means to gather and maintain 
manufacturing work. 
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One means the arsenals have attempted in order to 
secure work and thus prolong their future is the 
implementation of protectionist laws such as the Army 
Arsenal Act and the Stratton Amendment.  The Army Arsenal 
Act, established in 1920, requires the Army to make their 
supplies in the arsenals if they can do so more 
economically than a commercial source.  The Stratton 
Amendment, established in 1986, prohibits the transfer of 
large-caliber cannon tube technology to foreign countries.  
There was less emphasis on these laws during in the Cold 
War era when defense work was plentiful.  However, they are 
now proving to be important protectionist tools in the 
fight to keep Arsenal personnel employed and facilities 
utilized at the Army's only two remaining manufacturing 
arsenals:  Rock Island and Watervliet.   
The Army Arsenal Act primary affects large ground-
based weapon systems.  In a program such as the LW155, 
where the program office is attempting to leverage existing 
research and development efforts, the Army Arsenal Act can 
become a factor for two major reasons.  First, the 
Comptroller General’s 1960 determination to use only “out-
of-pocket” expenses during the make or buy analysis 
required under the Act places private industry competitors 
at a disadvantage in initial source selection 
determinations.  More importantly, the PMO’s outlays to the 
arsenal are not the same as those used for the make or buy 
decision.  Second, failure by the program office, in an 
Army-specific, or Joint Service venture involving the Army, 
to explore the applicability of the Army Arsenal Act can 
lead to prolonged interest and involvement by those with a 
stake in the survival of our national arsenals.  It is the 
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job of the Judicial Branch of Government to interpret the 
law.  As a result, differences of opinion between the 
program office and the arsenal stakeholders will likely 
culminate in lengthy court battles that will ultimately 
slow the progress of the program, redirect resources, and 
hinder the PM’s ability to make decisions in the best 
interest of the system's end-user. 
The Stratton Amendment impacts any weapon system 
program that incorporates a large-caliber cannon into the 
design.  The PMO is prevented from transferring the TDPs 
for cannon technology to foreign countries without special 
waiver from the Secretary of the Army.  This can negatively 
impact the PM's ability to reduce program costs and 
increase multi-national cooperation by limiting the 
allowable involvement of allies in design, development, and 
production. 
 In summary, the Army Arsenal Act and the Stratton 
Amendment are legislative statutes designed to protect the 
viability of our national arsenals.  The statues ultimately 
serve to constrain the PM's ability to freely pursue "best 
value" and cost saving measures for the program.  
Therefore, from the perspective of the PM, they can limit 
his/her ability to make the decisions necessary to provide 
the best overall product to the end-user.  
2. Subsidiary Questions Review 
• What is the XM777 Joint Lightweight Howitzer 
Program? 
The XM777 Joint Lightweight Howitzer, or LW155, is a 
Joint Marine Corps and Army towed artillery system designed 
to provide both close and deep fires to support both Marine 
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Corps and Army Maneuver forces.  The XM777 is scheduled to 
replace the aging M198 weapon system currently in the Army 
and Marine Corps inventories.  The goal of the LW155 
program is to produce and field a weapon system that is 
considerably lighter in weight and easier to support 
logistically than the current system.   
The Marine Corps approved the MNS in 1993 and the Army 
adopted it the following year.  The JORD was approved by 
both Services in 1995, and the RFP for the EMD contract was 
released on April 10, 1996.  The intent of the program was 
to leverage the development of existing competitive 
prototypes.  The team of Textron Marine and Land Systems of 
New Orleans and VSEL of England was awarded the contract 
following a shoot-off competition.  However, a series of 
contract novations and industry mergers left the EMD 
contract in the hands of BAE Systems, a United Kingdom 
company, in November of 1999.  The JPO achieved a 
successful Milestone C decision in November of 2002 and BAE 
Systems was subsequently awarded the LRIP contract. 
The LW155 program, like most other major defense 
programs, has experienced cost growth, schedule delays, and 
performance setbacks.  Problems with the original 
contractor added almost three years to the program and 
testing issues concerning availability of production-
representative howitzers added two more.  Most major cost 
growth problems related to the major slips in the schedule.  
Additional cost uncertainties were a result of fluctuations 
in cannon barrel costing from WVA. The GAO in their 
reports, and the MCOTEA in their testing, identified 
several technical design problems and non-technical issues 
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involving the LW155 program.  The JPO resolved the 
technical issues through additional testing and inclusion 
of an LRIP phase.  The technical design problems were 
successfully proved-out during the OA held in mid-2002.  
Although the program has experienced almost five years of 
delays and $235.3 million of cost growth since 1998, it 
successfully entered the Production and Deployment Phase in 
November 2002 with a projected IOC for the Marine Corps in 
2005 and the Army in 2006.   
• What are the Army Arsenal Act and the Stratton 
Amendments? 
Congress, in 1920, enacted the original legislation 
that would eventually be codified as the Army Arsenal Act 
in 10 U.S.C. Sec 4532.  The Arsenal Act requires the 
Secretary of the Army to have supplies needed for the Army 
manufactured in arsenals so far as the arsenals can make 
those supplies on an economic basis. The purpose of the 
statue, well recognized by both the Executive and Judicial 
Branches, is aimed at preserving the Government's in-house 
production capabilities.  RIA and WVA are the only two 
remaining U.S. Government-owned and operated manufacturing 
arsenals.  
The Stratton Amendment of 1987, as codified U.S.C. 
Sec. 4542, is another statue designed to protect arsenal 
production capabilities.  The Amendment prohibits the 
transfer of TDPs for large-caliber cannon to a foreign 
country for a defense item being manufactured or developed 
in an arsenal.  The Amendment does allow for exception 
under specific circumstances and with approval of the 
Secretary of the Army.  WVA is the primary benefactor of 
the Stratton Amendment because it is the only GOGO facility 
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remaining with the capability and expertise necessary to 
design or produce large-caliber cannon.   
Although the statute clearly defines the requirements 
for exception under the law, it is ambiguous concerning 
what constitutes a TDP for a large-caliber cannon.  The 
Stratton Amendment, unlike the Army Arsenal Act, is as yet 
untested in the courts.   
• On what occasions have the Army Arsenal Act and 
the Stratton Amendments affected the LW155 
Program and why, how did the JPO react, and what 
were the ramifications to the program of their 
reactions?  
There have been three occasions since the approval of 
the MNS in 1993 when the LW155 program and the legislation 
in question have interacted.  These occasions coincide with 
(1) the litigation; (2) production of components; and (3) 
foreign involvement in the program.  Each of these 
occasions, as well as the JPOs reaction, and the results 
and ramifications on the program are summarized in Table 8.  
 The first occasion for interaction occurred when RIA 
was disqualified from the shoot-off competition for the 
LW155 EMD contract.  Their disqualification led Lewis 
Machine and Tool Co., the contractor representing RIA's 
prototype howitzer, to unsuccessfully file suit against the 
Government in an attempt to gain the contract.  Shortly 
thereafter, the AFGE chapter representing RIA's employees 
brought suit against the Program as well.  They attempted, 
again unsuccessfully, to show the LW155 Program had 
significant Army involvement and therefore should have 
conducted a make or buy analysis prior to release of the 
EMD solicitation in accordance with the requirements of the 
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Army Arsenal Act.  Although unsuccessful, these suits 
continually involved the JPO in litigation from 1996 to 
2001.  The attention brought by the suits led to a 
spectacular amount of Congressional interest in the program 
including three intensive GAO reviews and a Congressional 
mandate for utilization of RIA.  The suits did eventually 
result in three decisions beneficial to the LW155 and 
ultimately all Army programs: (1) The Lewis case validated 
the Army's policy for make or buy decisions set forth in 
the Conver-Livingstone Memorandum of 1992; (2) The AFGE 
case validated the Services' rational for determining the 
Lead Service in a joint program; and (3) The M1 Abrams Tank 
cannon mount portion of the AFGE case validated the Army 
policy concerning a prime contractor's right to choose 
subcontractors when purchasing components under "System 
Buy" type contracts without fear of violating the Army 
Arsenal Act. 
The second occasion for interaction, production of 
components, became an issue when in late 1999 Congress, 
probably predicting the failure of the AFGE suit to force 
applicability under the Arsenal Act, issued their 
requirement to include RIA in plans for producibility and 
manufacturing.  The JPO responded with a report detailing 
their plan to leverage RIA's knowledge and experience.  
However, it also presented their intent to allow the 
contractor, under the “System Buy" policy, to make "best 
value" decisions concerning components.  The appellate 
decision in the AFTE case reinforced the JPO's position 
concerning the contractor's responsibilities under the 
"System Buy" type of contract. 
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The third occasion for interaction, foreign 
involvement, became an issue first when the Italian 
Government made the decision to produce cannon assemblies, 
and later when WVA raised the price of the cannon tubes by 
approximately $100,000.  The Stratton Amendment prevented 
the JPO from supplying the cannon assembly TDPs to the 
Italians.  As a result, the Italians decided to absorb the 
significant additional cost of developing and producing 
their own version of the cannon assemblies.  WVA stood to 
lose up to nine percent of their total production with the 
possibility of losing up to 15% if the U.K. decided to 
purchase cannon assemblies from Italy instead of the U.S.  
The JPO would also see a per-unit cost increase for the 
cannon assemblies as the overhead costs at WVA were spread 
over fewer production units.   
Prior to the November 2002 production decision, WVA 
notified the JPO that the price of each cannon assembly 
would increase by approximately $100,000 due to under-
funding of IMC Program requirements at WVA.  The LW155 
program would have had to absorb their share of the 
overhead costs, amounting to almost $90 million over the 
life of the program, associated with the funding cuts.  The 
DoN reached an agreement with the Army to exempt the USMC 
production items from IMC costs.  Additionally, they agreed 
to fully fund WVA's base operations for the first year.  
However, the arsenals and the JPO will still remain 
susceptible to the effects of future funding cuts to the 
arsenals when Army production begins in FY05.  More 
importantly, the entire pricing structure of the Arsenals 
is at the mercy of annual IMC funding decisions beyond 
their control.  This fact alone makes GOGO arsenals less 
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attractive to PMs.  The risk associated with cost 
fluctuations caused by funding decisions outside the 
control of the arsenal makes private contractors, with more 
control over corporate funding decisions, a significantly 













Table 8.   Summary of Arsenal Act and Stratton 
Amendment Interaction with LW155 Program. 
 
Occasion JPO Reaction Results/Ramifications 
Army Arsenal Act (AAA)  






LMTC (appellate decision in 1997) and 
AFGE (appellate decision in 2000) 
lawsuits 
 
Four years of continuous 
litigation and uncertainty about 
program’s future 
Congressional interest and 
oversight 
     -Three GAO reports 
     -Congressional report  
Case law precedents 
     -Make or buy decision timing 
     -AAA in joint programs 
 












No further requirements surfaced from 
Congress concerning utilization of 
RIA and the AFGE System Buy decision 
supported Army Policy and JPO’s 
position  











U.K. now has choice of Cannon 
Assembly suppliers 
Monetary loss to program/WVA 
     -Per unit cost increase 
 
     -WVA loss of up to 15% of Cannon 
Assembly production
WVA raises price 
of Cannon 





to effect on 
program  
Funding commitment secured from Army 
& Congress, but WVA ICM Program 
funding still susceptible to cuts in 
future years of program 
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Another issue involving the Stratton Amendment and PFM 
production never came to fruition, but the JPO's stance on 
the issue is none-the-less important.  The JPO contends 
that not everything designed at WVA automatically falls 
under the Stratton Amendment for that reason alone.  The 
LW155 team ultimately decided to let WVA manufacture the 
PFM for reasons of cost and risk.  However, the JPO asserts 
that under different circumstances they would defend their 
position in the courts if necessary.  This is an excellent 
example of how the position of a stakeholder influences the 
interpretation of the law.   
BAE Systems also informed the JPO in 2003 of their 
intention to create a U.S. subsidiary for the full-rate 
production contract administration.  As a result, the U.K.-
based contractor would be able to avoid all manner of 
issues involving the Stratton Amendment and other 
legislation dealing with the export of data.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The resurgence of emphasis on the Army Arsenal Act and 
the Stratton Amendment as tools for protecting the future 
viability of manufacturing arsenals serves as a signal to 
PM community.  This researcher believes it is in the best 
interest of both the program office and their programs that 
they perform the following: 
• Consult with the program or potential program's 
legal representation as early as possible in the 
acquisition process concerning applicability of 
the Army Arsenal Act.  Particularly in joint 
service programs, this research has shown that 
applicability of the Arsenal Act is not 
necessarily dependent upon which Service is 
dedicating the majority of the funding because 
programs change over time.  Rather, clearly 
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establishing the program documentation and role 
of each Service is paramount to defending the 
position of the program with regard to the Act. 
• Review the Stratton Amendment for any program 
containing a weapon system with even the 
potential of incorporating a large-caliber 
cannon. 
• Incorporate applicability of protectionist 
legislation into early risk assessment processes 
for any program where make/buy decisions, or 
teaming with foreign nations are possible 
acquisition strategies. 
C. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following areas for potential further study are 
based upon the conclusions of this research effort: 
• Research in depth the advantages and 
disadvantages of the Army's current requirements 
and procedures for conducting an economic 
analysis in accordance with the Army Arsenal Act. 
• Explore in depth the potential conflicts between 
legislation designed to protect GOCO facilities, 
(both arsenals and depots), protectionist 
legislation designed to protect both public and 
private U.S. industries from foreign competition, 
and the DoD’s current policies concerning 
outsourcing and teaming with global allies.   
• Conduct a case study regarding the Army Arsenal 
Act and the Stratton Amendment similar to the one 
conducted here, but from the perspective of the 
Arsenals and their stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
AFGE  American Federation of Government Employees 
AIA  Aerospace Industrial Association  
ALT  Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 
AMC  Army Material Command 
AMC-R Army Material Command Regulation 
AR  Army Regulation 
ARDEC Armament Research, Development, and  
Engineering Center 
ASA  Assistant Secretary of the Army 
ASN  Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
ASR  Acquisition Strategy Report 
BAE   British Aerospace Systems 
BCT  Brigade Combat Team 
CA  Cannon Assembly 
CBD  Commerce Business Daily 
DA  Department of the Army 
DL  Direct Labor 
DoD  Department of Defense  
DoN  Department of the Navy 
DWCFA Defense Working Capital Fund, Army 
EMD  Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
FPAF  Fixed Price Award Fee 
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FY  Fiscal Year 
GAO  General Accounting Office 
GFM  Government Furnished Material 
GOCO  Government-Owned Contractor-Operated 
GOGO  Government-Owned Government-Operated 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
GSIE  Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise 
ICA  Industrial Capabilities Assessment 
IMC  Industrial Mobilization Capactiy 
IOC  Initial Operational Capability 
IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
JORD  Joint Operational Requirements Document 
JPO  Joint Program Office  
KPP  Key Performance Parameters 
LMTC  Lewis Machine and Tool Company 
LRIP  Low-Rate Initial Production  
LW155 XM777 Joint Lightweight Howitzer System 
MCOTEA Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation  
Agency 
MNS  Mission Needs Statement 
MOA  Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NOSL  Laval Ordnance Station Louisville 
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OA  Operational Assessment 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OSA  Office of the Secretary of the Army 
OT&E  Operational Test and Evaluation 
PFM  Primer Feed Mechanism 
PM  Program Manager 
PMO  Program Management Office 
RDA  Research, Development and Acquisition 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
RFP  Request For Proposal 
RIA  Rock Island Arsenal 
SCP  Schedule, Cost and Performance 
TACOM Tank-automotive Armament Command 
TAD  Towed Artillery Digitization 
TDP  Technical Data Package 
U.K.  United Kingdom 
UPC  Unutilized Plant Capacity 
U.S.C. United States Code 
USMC  United States Marine Corps 
VSEL  Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. 
WVA  Watervliet Arsenal 
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APPENDIX B. THE STRATTON AMENDMENT 
10 USC Sec. 4542 
 
    TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
    Subtitle B - Army 
    PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 




    Sec. 4542. Technical data packages for large-caliber 




      (a) General Rule. - Funds appropriated to the 
Department of Defense may not be used – 
 
        (1) to transfer to a foreign country a technical 
data package for a defense item being manufactured or 
developed in an arsenal; 
      or 
        (2) to assist a foreign country in producing such a 
defense item. 
 
      (b) Exception. - The Secretary of the Army may use 
funds appropriated to the Department of Defense to transfer 
a technical data package, or to provide assistance, 
described in subsection (a)if - 
 
        (1) the transfer or provision of assistance is to a 
friendly foreign country (as determined by the Secretary of 
Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State); 
 
        (2) the Secretary of the Army determines that such 
action - 
 
          (A) would have a clear benefit to the preservation 
of the production base for the production of cannon at the 
arsenal concerned; and 
 
          (B) would not transfer technology (including 
production techniques) considered unique to the arsenal 
concerned, except as provided in subsection (e); and 
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        (3) the Secretary of Defense enters into an 
agreement with the country concerned described in subsection 
(c) or (d). 
 
      (c) Co-production Agreements. - An agreement under 
this subsection shall be in the form of a Government-to-
Government Memorandum of Understanding and shall include 
provisions that - 
 
        (1) prescribe the content of the technical data 
package or assistance to be transferred to the foreign 
country participating in the agreement; 
 
        (2) require that production by the participating 
foreign country of the defense item to which the technical 
data package or assistance relates be shared with the 
arsenal concerned; 
 
        (3) subject to such exceptions as may be approved 
under subsection (f), prohibit transfer by the participating 
foreign country to a third party or country of - 
 
          (A) any defense article, technical data package, 
technology, or assistance provided by the United States 
under the agreement; and 
 
          (B) any defense article produced by the 
participating foreign country under the agreement; and 
 
        (4) require the Secretary of Defense to monitor 
compliance with the agreement and the participating foreign 
country to report periodically to the Secretary of Defense 
concerning the agreement. 
 
      (d) Cooperative Project Agreements. - An agreement 
under this subsection is a cooperative project agreement 
under section 27 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
2767) which includes provisions that - 
 
        (1) for development phases describe the technical 
data to be transferred and for the production phase 
prescribe the content of the technical data package or 
assistance to be transferred to the foreign country 
participating in the agreement; 
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        (2) require that at least the United States 
production of the defense item to which the technical data 
package or assistance relates be carried out by the arsenal 
concerned; and 
 
        (3) require the Secretary of Defense to monitor 
compliance with the agreement. 
 
      (e) Licensing Fees and Royalties. - The limitation in 
subsection (b)(2)(B) shall not apply if the technology (or 
production technique) transferred is subject to nonexclusive 
license and payment of any negotiated licensing fee or 
royalty that reflects the cost of development, 
implementation, and prove-out of the technology or 
production technique.  Any negotiated license fee or royalty 
shall be placed in the operating fund of the arsenal 
concerned for the purpose of capital investment and 
technology development at that arsenal. 
 
      (f) Transfers to Third Parties. - A transfer described 
in subsection (c)(3) may be made if - 
 
        (1) the defense article, technical data package, or 
technology to be transferred is a product of a cooperative 
research and development program or a cooperative project in 
which the United States and the participating foreign 
country were partners; or 
 
        (2) the President - 
 
          (A) complies with all requirements of section 3(d) 
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753(d)) with 
respect to such transfer; and 
 
          (B) certifies to Congress, before the transfer, 
that the transfer would provide a clear benefit to the 
production base of the United States for large-caliber 
cannon. 
 
      (g) Notice and Reports to Congress. - (1) The 
Secretary of the Army shall submit to Congress a notice of 
each agreement entered into under this section. 
 
      (2) The Secretary shall submit to Congress a semi-
annual report on the operation of this section and of 
agreements entered into under this section. 
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      (h) Arsenal Defined. - In this section, the term 
''arsenal'' means a Government-owned, Government-operated 




    (Added Pub. L. 99-500, Sec. 101(c) (title IX, Sec. 
9036(b)(1)), Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783-82, 1783-107, and 
Pub. L. 99-591, Sec. 101(c) (title IX, Sec. 9036(b)(1)), 
Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-82, 3341-107; Pub. L. 99-661, 
div.  A, title XII, Sec. 1203(a)(1), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 
Stat. 3968; amended Pub. L. 101-189, div.  A, title VIII, 
Sec. 806, Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1489; Pub. 
 L. 102-190, div.  A, title X, Sec. 1061(a)(24), 1086, Dec. 




      Pub. L. 99-591 is a corrected version of Pub. L. 99-
500. 
 
      Pub. L. 99-500, Pub. L. 99-591, and Pub. L. 99-661 




                      AMENDMENTS 
 
      1991 - Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 102-190, Sec. 1086(a), 
substituted ''friendly foreign country'' for ''member nation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or a country 
designated as a major non-NATO ally''. 
 
      Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 102-190, Sec. 1061(a)(24)(A), 
1086(b)(1), amended par. (3) identically, substituting 
''subsection (f)'' for ''subsection (d)'' in introductory 
provisions. 
 
      Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 102-190, Sec. 1061(a)(24)(B), 
1086(b)(2), amended subsec. identically, substituting 
''subsection (c)(3)'' for ''subsection (b)(3)'' in 
introductory provisions. 
 
      1989 - Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 101-189, Sec. 
806(a)(1), substituted ''a member nation of the North 
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Atlantic Treaty Organization or a country designated as a 
major non-NATO ally'' for ''a friendly foreign country''. 
 
      Subsec. (b)(2)(B). Pub. L. 101-189, Sec. 806(a)(2), 
inserted '', except as provided in subsection (e)'' after 
''arsenal concerned''. 
 
      Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 101-189, Sec. 806(a)(3), 
inserted ''or 
 
    (d)'' after ''subsection (c)''. 
 
      Subsecs. (d), (e). Pub. L. 101-189, Sec. 806(b)(2), 
added subsecs. (d) and (e). Former subsecs. (d) and (e) 
redesignated (f) and (g), respectively. 
 
      Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 101-189, Sec. 806(b)(1), 
redesignated subsec. (d) as (f). Former subsec. (f) 
redesignated (h). 
 
      Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 101-189, Sec. 806(c), inserted 
''or a cooperative project'' after ''cooperative research 
and development program''. 
 
      Subsecs. (g), (h). Pub. L. 101-189, Sec. 806(b)(1), 
redesignated subsecs. (e) and (f) as (g) and (h), 
respectively. 
 
                               EFFECTIVE DATE 
 
      Section 101(c) (title IX, Sec. 9036(c)) of Pub. L. 99-
500 and Pub. L. 99-591, and section 1203(b) of Pub. L. 99-
661 provided that: ''Section 4542 of title 10, United States 
Code, as added by subsection (a), shall apply with respect 
to funds appropriated for fiscal years after fiscal year 
1986.'' 
 
     RULE OF CONSTRUCTION FOR DUPLICATE AUTHORIZATION AND 
APPROPRIATION PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAWS 99-500, 99-591, AND 
99-661 For rule of construction for certain duplicate 
provisions of Public Laws 99-500, 99-591, and 99-661, see 
Pub. L. 100-26, Sec. 6, Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat. 274, set 
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